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Islamic feminism in Iran is defined as the radical rethinking of religious and sacred
texts from a feminist perspective. The purpose of this research is to show how an Islamic
feminist discourse developed in Iran, and to outline the differences between the reformist
and traditionalist epistemological foundations of women’s rights discourse in Iran.
This study, using documentary research methods, demonstrates that central to the
development of Islamic feminism is the development of the reformist movement in Iran.
Moreover, it is shown that the main impedance to women’s equality in Iran is the
traditionalist epistemology in religious law. While reformists believe that employing
justice in Islamic law requires absolute equality regarding both men and women’s rights,
traditionalists present a different interpretation of the notion of justice. According to the
traditionalist discourse, since men and women have natural and inborn differences, two
separate kinds of law are needed to regulate their lives.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Introduction:
After the Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran, a religious government took control over
Iranian society. The Islamic republic of Iran ordained a set of Islamic laws and compelled
people to obey an official interpretation of Islam, which was announced by clergies at the
highest powerful position in the political structure of Iran. This official monolithic
interpretation of Islamic texts has put Iranian women in a difficult situation, as they have
been deprived of some parts of their citizen rights and have been confronted with
limitations regarding their presence in public places.
In recent decades, Iranian secular activists, mostly living in Western countries, have tried
to build support for Iranian women’s rights. They have tried to regain rights for women
lost through the re-Islamization policies of the Islamic government in Iran. Although these
activities were slightly successful in publicizing Iranian women’s circumstances to the
world, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom for women and
restoring their rights inside Iran (Ahmadi 2006). The main reason for these unsuccessful
attempts is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has labeled secular discourses as anti-Islamic
discourses, and hence has prevented their development in Iranian religious culture.
Moreover, like other Islamic countries in the Middle East, secular discourses could not be
accepted by the majority of the Iranian population, who are Muslims and follow their rights
within Islamic discourse. Hence, it seems that a religious movement from inside the
country was needed to change the dominant discourse presented by the government and
help Iranian women attain their rights as full citizens. This movement has started in recent
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decades in Iran, with the purpose of reinterpreting religious sources from a nontraditionalist perspective and presenting an egalitarian interpretation of Islamic scriptures.
Iranian Muslim feminists have presented their feminist discourse within an Islamic context.
However, their interpretation of religious and sacred texts on women’s issues is different
from that of official clergies. Muslim feminists have demanded alterations in the traditional
interpretation of sacred texts and consequently modifications to Islamic laws extracted
from religious sources. Traditional jurists, who were responsible for extracting Islamic
law from sacred texts and held absolute power over state institutions, did not tolerate any
reformist voices outside of dominant traditionalist discourse. With the expansion of
feminist activism, Muslim feminists have been confronted with problems imposed by the
Iranian government as the main supporter of traditionalist discourse of Islam. These
problems have caused social and political burden for feminist activists, as well as academic
scholars (Najmabadi 1995). Thousands of women put their lives, their careers, and their
families in danger fighting for recognition as full citizens and restoring their human rights
(Ahmadi 2006). In this political condition, some other feminists preferred to leave the
country and choose a lonely life in exile rather than living under the rules of the Islamic
Republic.
However, unlike the existing problems, and barriers that were put in the way of feminist
activists by the Islamic government, Iranian Muslim feminists could exhibit admirable
resistance against governmental pressures. They could develop a new discourse on
feminism and Islam, challenging dominant fundamental discourse supported by traditional
jurists. As a result of their endeavors, Islamic feminism, as a movement, has increasingly
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become mainstream in Iran. Islamic feminism is defined here as the radical rethinking of
religious and sacred texts from a feminist perspective. Reformist and feminist thinkers in
Iran have tried to present a new interpretation of sacred texts in order to combat repressive
policies and to advocate for equal legal rights. This new approach includes not only
reinterpretation of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), but also reinterpretation of shariʼa1
(Maqasid al-shariʼa) as the principal foundation of Islamic law. This movement of
reinterpreting Islamic principles from a feminist perspective was so unprecedented in the
Islamic world that it led Ziba Mir-Hosseini to remark, “The doors opened to a new
interpretation and new thinking of religious and sacred texts in Iran, in a new scale that is
unparalleled in the history of Islamic law” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 12).
Various political, economic, and social factors have influenced the development of Islamic
feminism in Iran. The processes of globalization have brought awareness of various
political interpretations of women’s rights discourses around the world and helped women
to rethink their own society’s policies and norms (Tohidi 2002: 1). The processes of
globalization have linked the Iranian situation to a global struggle for freedom based on a
gender rights discourse emerging from Western societies. In particular, postmodernism has
helped Iranian Muslim feminists rethink gendered Islam (Ahmadi 2006). Notwithstanding
the impact of Western feminism on the Iranian discourses, central to the development of
Islamic feminism is the development of the reformist movement in Iran. Iranian reformism
1

“The shariʼa in its popular usage indicated the religion of Islam, God`s true religion as it embodies
revelation in praxis” (Sachedina 1999a: 15). Therefore, it is perceived as a part of revelation (wahy); while,
fiqh is a part of religious science whose aim is to recognize and bring out shariʼa legal rules from Islamic
sacred sources: the Qurʼan and Sunna. Fiqh is a legal science with its own methodology and legal theories
(usul-al fiqh theories); this science was developed by fuqahaʼ during the centuries in dialogue with other
religious and non-religious sciences. In other words, shariʼa is sacred and eternal while fiqh is a human
science and subject to change.
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aims not only to review Islamic laws regarding various aspects of human life (including
women’s issues), but also to challenge the philosophical foundation of these laws from a
modern and postmodern perspective. From this foundation, the women’s movement can be
categorized within the reformist movement, which began in late nineteenth century Iran
(Mir-Hosseini 2002; Tohidi 2006).
The objective of Iranian Islamist feminism is the pursuit of equality and justice in Islamic
law on gender issues (Lorestani 2003). Iranian Islamist feminists challenge traditional
jurists by presenting new discourses underlying Islamic legal thought. These discourses
can be divided into two types: neo-traditionalist and reformist. While neo-traditionalist
discourse was almost successful in restoring women’s rights, the greater possibility for
greater women’s rights in Iran is more likely through the language of reformism (MirHosseini 2001). Reformist discourse, in contrast to neo-traditionalist discourse, sees
women’s sexuality as regulated by social circumstances and not by Divine will. Reformist
discourse claims gender inequality embedded in Islamic laws as a societal construction by
male jurists that is neither sacred nor fixed, and rather is human and subject to contestation.
Both reformist and traditional thinkers believe that Islam is a religion of fairness and
justice. They both see in the shariʼa equality for both genders, however they reach different
conclusions in applying Islamic laws from the shariʼa. The tension between these two
groups in interpreting the shariʼa is a matter of perspective with regards to a discourse of
rights. Do humans have inalienable rights or are rights mutually reciprocal communitarian
duties? Reformists speak of “human rights,” while traditionalists speak of “human duties”.
Also, while reformists believe that employing fairness and justice in Islamic laws requires
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absolute equality regarding both men and women’s rights, traditionalists present a different
interpretation of the notion of justice. They believe that Islamic law is fair toward both
genders, but this fairness does not mean proportional equality. From a biological
perspective, women and men have some natural and inborn differences that demand
different considerations regarding their rights and duties. Because men and women are
different, two separate kinds of laws are needed to regulate their lives. Only by
acknowledging these biological differences can true justice toward women be achieved.
Reformism seeks to further develop this line of thinking to advocate for women’s rights
rather than challenging this epistemology with the introduction of an antithetical Western
rights discourse.
This research will focus on epistemological and philosophical foundations of the reformist
and traditional discourses underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran. The two main questions
my research will answer are:
How has an Islamic feminist discourse in Iran developed from the reformist movement?
What are the epistemological foundations of traditional and reformist discourses regarding
women’s issues and gender rights?
This research is organized into four chapters. The first chapter will cover the introduction,
significance and importance of the study, methodology, and literature review. The second
chapter will present a review of Islamic feminism in Iran and other Islamic countries. Also,
it will discuss the influences of various factors, including reformist ideas, on the
development of Islamic feminism in Iran. The third chapter will include reformist, neo-
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traditionalist, and traditionalist interpretations of women’s issues. It will also discuss recent
updates in traditionalist discourse on women’s rights. The forth chapter will examine the
issue of justice, gender roles, and women’s rights in both reformist and traditionalist
epistemologies. Moreover, it will discuss the differences of philosophy and epistemology
of traditionalist and reformist discourses in interpreting religious texts and sacred sources.
Significance and Importance:
The main reasons for traditional interpretation of Islamic legal thought on women’s rights
in Iran can be classified into three categories: ideological, political and epistemological.
The ideological perspective focuses on the patriarchal structure of Islamic law. The
political perspective focuses on the exclusion of women in the process of interpreting
religious texts. The epistemological perspective questions the traditional assumptions
underlying the interpretation of shariʼa and fiqh. Patriarchy has certainly influenced jurists’
worldview in their interpretation of religious texts. This has excluded women from the
processes of interpreting Islamic law. Recently, however, globalization has interconnected
global discourses on gender rights and women’s issues. The consequences of this will be
profound on the development women’s rights Iran. Already, we are seeing an increasing
presence of women in educational, political and social structures of Iran in recent decades.
The number of women in higher education has increased dramatically in recent years
(Bahrami and Etemadi 2013). In recent years, there has been an increase in women entering
the Iranian workforce (Ibid). From 2006 to 2011, we witnessed a 6 percent increase in the
number of female employees in both governmental and private companies (Khosroshahi
2014). Moreover, women have demonstrated great interest in working in women-oriented,
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non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this regard, the number of NGOs run by
women has significantly increased within the last decades 2. In tandem, there have been
reformist endeavors in the Iranian parliament to legislate laws in order to improve women’s
conditions within the family and provide employment protections (Mir-Hosseini 2002).
Indeed, past decades observed a flourishing progress in women’s social, cultural and
intellectual productions in Iran. After the Islamic revolution of Iran, in contrast to the
deepest fear of the Islamic government from the activities of secular feminists, women not
only were not disappeared from public places, but also they could achieve much success in
their private and public lives; women had a considerable presence in educational and
industrial organizations, artistic creations, professional occupations and even sports
activities (Najmabadi 1995: 52).
Therefore, it seems that increasing the visible presence of women in social and political
life will eventually erode the patriarchal legal structure and empower women through
progressive legislation.
Despite social and political gains for Iranian women in recent years, the main impedance
to women’s equality is traditionalist epistemology in religious law. Women are still
excluded from interpreting religious and sacred sources. The development of Islamic law
is still controlled by traditional jurists, despite reformist gains in recent years. Traditional
jurists have made modifications in some parts of Islamic law concerning women’s rights
in recent decades. However, the majority of Islamic laws on gender rights and women’s

2

For further review, see “Zanane tarikhe moasere Iran dar chahardahe akhir, ghesmate dovom” (Iranian
Women in Recent four decades, Part two), Pegah Houzeh, 07/26/2008,
http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine
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issues has remained unchanged. Indeed, the conflict between reformists and traditionalists
is based upon a fundamental difference of the underlying philosophy of women’s role
based on the conceptions of rights and duties and corresponding notions of justice and
equality. Significant progress in changing Islamic law regarding women’s issues and
gender rights will not be achieved until the foundation of traditionalist discourses is
challenged. In summary, this research will outline the duality of reformist and traditionalist
epistemological foundations of women’s rights discourses in Iran.
Literature Review:
Feminist Movements in Iran:
Feminist activism in Iran is classified into two major groups: secular and Islamic. Because
of political pressure in Iran in the early years of Islamic revolution, feminist activism was
mostly restricted to the activities of secular women outside of Iran. Najmabadi (1995),
Moghisi (1999), and Ahmadi (2006) describe the suffering conditions for women after the
Islamic revolution in Iran. Najmabadi (1995) calls those years, “yeas of hardship, years of
growth.”
While secular activists in and outside of Iran have tried to regain women’s political and
social rights, as well as draw the attention of the international world to the suffering
situation of Iranian women, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom
for women inside Iran as an Islamic country. Ahmadi (2006) refers to the reasons for the
secular activists’ lack of success in restoring women’s rights in Iran.
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On the other hand, the Islamic feminist movement could achieve more success than the
secular feminist movement in bringing freedom for women in Iran. Iranian Muslim women
have accepted Islamic feminist discourse as an authenticate source for expressing their
political and social demands, as well as for requesting equal rights in Islamic jurisprudence.
Muslim feminists have tried to oppose the clergy’s monolithic readership of Islam; they
have challenged the traditional interpretation of Islamic theological and legal sources to
present a new tendency in Islamic feminism. Ahmadi (2006) and Najmabadi (1995)
describe the process of the development of Islamic feminism in the past decades in Iran.
Mir-Hosseini (1996, 1998, 2003) mostly mentions the philosophical foundations of Islamic
feminist discourse, which was supported by traditional jurists at the top of the political
hierarchy Iran, and their conflict with traditionalist discourse. She also describes the
similarities between reformist discourse and Islamic feminist discourse, as well as the
major differences between reformists and traditionalists in their interpretation of Islamic
law regarding gender roles and women’s issues.
Islamic Feminism in the Middle East:
Islamic feminism is not only restricted to Iran. We can witness the development of feminist
movements in other Islamic countries in the Middle East. Karam (2011: 202) classifies
feminist movements in the Middle East and Arab countries into three streams in a
continuum: secular, religious, and Islamic. She describes the characteristics of these three
movements in the Arab World and their relation to one another. She mentions that barely,
in the Middle East and Arab World, is there any admiration and verification from religious
circles for those working outside of these circles, like secular activists. Indeed, secular and
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religious feminist movements had less success in restoring women’s rights in Arab
countries in comparison with the Islamic feminist movement.
Mehrangiz Kar (1993) discusses that like other Islamic countries in the Middle East, the
feminist movement was a very marginal issue among followers of religions other than
Islam. Also, the secular feminist movement in Iran could not attain more success in
bringing freedom for women. Islamic feminism was the most powerful means to
advocating for women’s rights in Iran, which was the same as in other Islamic countries.
However, Islamic feminism in Iran has considerable differences from Islamic feminism in
the Arab World. Mir-Hosseini (1996, 2003) refers to these differences between Muslim
feminists in Iran and other Islamic countries in their interpretation of religious texts and
extracting Islamic law from sacred sources.
Islamic feminism in Iran:
Bardan (2002) provides a general definition of Islamic feminism, and Moghissi (1999)
mentions various characteristics of Islamic feminism in Islamic countries. Mir-Hosseini
(1996) and Esposito (1998) talk about differences between Islamic feminism in Iran and
other Islamic countries. They say that Muslim feminists in Iran demanded not only the
rethinking of Islamic legal sources, but also the reinterpretation of sacred texts from a
feminist perspective. To develop their feminist discourse, Iranian Muslim women applied
their life experiences as women to their interpretation of sacred texts, as well as their
independent research in various religious sources. Ahmadi (2006) and Bardan (2002)
mention the main methodologies used by Iranian Muslim women in developing Islamic
feminist discourse in Iran.
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Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran:
We can classify various factors that influenced the development of Islamic feminism in
Iran into three main groups: the reformist movement, postmodern theories, and the
globalization of women’s struggle for freedom. Mir-Hosseini (1996) and Tohidi (2006)
discuss how Iranian Muslim feminists employed reformist ideas in their discussion of
women’s rights and gender roles in Islam. They believe that Islamic feminist discourse in
Iran has actually emerged from within the reformist discourse.
Amir Arjomand (2004) and Ahmadi (2006) talk about the influences of postmodern
theories on the development of Islamic feminism in Iran. Amir Arjomand believes that the
Islamic feminist movement in Iran is a modern movement using modern and postmodern
ideas in its discourse. Ahmadi provides examples of using postmodern conceptual tools by
Iranian Muslim feminists in their discussion of women’s issues in Islam. For instance,
through employing postmodern critiques of language in their discussion, Iranian Muslim
feminists could unveil the role of Arabic language in maintaining a gender-biased
interpretation of sacred sources.
In addition to the reformist movement and postmodern ideas, the globalization of women’s
challenges for equality and justice paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to develop
their own feminist discourse. Awareness of various interpretations of women’s rights
brought on by the processes of globalization for Iranian Muslim feminists has helped them
to rethink their own society’s policies and norms. Tohidi (2006) discusses how the
processes of globalization made Iranian feminists familiar with feminist movements in
Western and Islamic countries.
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Reformist Discourse:
Islamic feminist discourse in Iran can be classified as a part of the reformist discourse. New
interpretations of sacred texts from a modern perspective, which was presented by Iranian
Muslim reformers, paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to demand reformulating
Islamic laws on women’s issues from a feminist perspective.
While most of reformist intellectuals in Iran have not subscribed to the gender equality
discourse, their reformist theories on the interpretation of sacred texts and Islamic
knowledge have enabled Iranian religious women to attune their faith with their feminist
ideas.
Iranian reformists have gathered at the Kiyan Institute, an intellectual and cultural institute
in Tehran, around Abdolkarinm Soroush. Soroush’s reformist theories stimulated Iranian
Muslim feminists to discuss of women’s rights in Islam and propose the necessity of
reinterpreting sacred texts from a feminist perspective. Indeed, among various reformist
ideas, Soroush’s theories had the most influence on shaping Iranian feminist discourse.
One of his most influential ideas on shaping Iranian Islamic feminism was his discussion
about the meaning of essential and accidental in Islam. Soroush (1989, 1999) separates
essential parts of the Qurʼan, which are unchangeable and everlasting, from accidentals,
which are subject to change and contestation. He confirms that essential parts of sacred
texts include the core message of religion, while accidentals are the events that have taken
place in the history of Islam. These historical events must not be taken as the spirit of Islam.
Soroush (1995, 2000) believes that we should pay attention to the historical and contextual
background of the Qurʼan in our interpretation of sharia’ and Islamic law.
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In another reformist theory, known as the “expansion of Prophetic experience,” Soroush
(1999) describes how the prophet’s disciples expanded his religious experience in the
history and developed Islamic knowledge. He argues that the Islamic knowledge expanded
by the prophet’s disciples must also be taken into account as the main sources of Islamic
law. Hence, Islamic laws are not immutable, since they are not only based on what was
stated in the Qurʼan and Sunna.
Other reformers, like Alavitabar (2003) and Amirarjomand (2002), expand Soroush’s
theory about the accidentals of history to a vast degree, which covers most parts of sacred
texts. Hence, they believe majority of sacred texts are to be reinterpreted from a modern
perspective in order to be employed to the present time.
Traditionalist Discourse:
Traditionalist discourse was developed by jurists on the basis of the biological differences
between men and women. In this discourse, gender inequality is taken for granted.
Women’s rights have no place in traditionalist discourse and gender relations are based on
women’s duties. Mir-Hosseini (2003) declares that, in traditionalist discourse, women are
seen as sexual beings, not as social beings; the only domain in traditionalist discourse in
which women’s rights are partly discussed is the family law. She talks about gender-biased
assumptions underlying traditionalist discourse, as well as the traditional interpretation of
family laws proposed by jurists in Iran.
Also, traditionalist discourse reflects social and cultural circumstances of the society in
which traditional jurists had lived. The patriarchal structure in that society shaped the
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worldview of classical jurists in their understanding of sacred texts. Ahmed (1992) and
Mernissi (1991) discuss the influences of the patriarchal structure on the thinking modes
of classical jurists.
The ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi are a representative of traditionalist discourse in
contemporary Iran. His opinions are in line with the policies of the Islamic Republic of
Iran on women’s rights and gender roles. Moreover, present traditional jurists usually refer
to his theories in their discussions on women’s issues. His interpretation of gender relations
and women’s rights in Islam has been published in Tahura magazine (2008).
Neo-traditionalist Discourse:
Another discourse underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran is the neo-traditionalist, or
modern, discourse. Neo-traditional jurists tried to find a solution for modern problems that
emerged in Islamic countries because of the changed status of women.
Mir-Hosseini (1999) and Siddiqi (1952) discuss how neo-traditionalists tried to resist
against the emergence of Western values in Islamic countries, as well as support for gender
equality in Islamic law. In this regard, Mir-Hosseini (2003) explains how neotraditionalists changed the gender-biased assumptions and theories underlying classical
fiqh texts.
The theories of complementarity of gender rights and duties and the naturalness of shariʼa
law, which was first proposed by Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari (1991), has been used by
jurists as the main foundation of neo-traditionalist discourse. In this regard, Mutahhari’s
interpretation of women’s rights, which was developed in his book, The System of Women’s
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rights in Islam (1991), is representative of the interpretation of women’s rights in neotraditionalist discourse.
Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist Discourse:
While traditional jurists changed the form of some parts of fiqh rules on gender issues, they
have mostly remained faithful to the classical interpretation of fiqh texts. Not only have
neo-traditional jurists followed Mutahhari’s ideas (1991) on women’s rights in Islam, but
also traditional jurists applied his theories in their arguments for gender roles and women’s
rights in Islam.
The ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi are a representative of traditionalist discourse in
contemporary Iran. His interpretation of gender relations and women’s rights in Islam has
been published in Tahura magazine (2008). He provides a rationalization for the traditional
interpretation of classical fiqh texts. He explains the meaning of rights and duties in Islam.
Moreover, he describes various conditions and circumstances under which an Islamic law
on gender issues can be modified. Indeed, traditionalist discourse mostly remained faithful
to the gender-biased assumptions underlying Islamic legal thought. Traditional jurists
focused on the literal meaning of sacred texts, and did not consider the meaning of contexts
in their interpretation of religious sources.
However, as mentioned before, neo-traditionalist discourse changed the gender-biased
assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts, and adopted the theory of naturalness of
shariʼa law. Neo-traditionalists employed the findings of human sciences in their
interpretation of religious sources, although their usage of modern theories in their analysis
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of gender relations was selective. Reformist discourse, in contrast to traditionalist and neotraditionalist discourse, did not rely on the literal meaning of verses in sacred texts, and
adopted a contextual and historical interpretation of religious sources. Reformers used
hermeneutic approach in their analysis of sacred texts. They did not accept gender-biased
assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts as valid and reliable assumptions. Also, their
usage of modern theories, in their discussions for women’s rights in Islam, was not
selective.
Methodology:
This research is based on documentary and library archival research. Documentary
research methods include analysis of documents that contain information about the
phenomenon we wish to study (Bailey, 1994). This type of research is used to investigate
and categorize physical sources, namely written documents, whether in the private or
public domain (Payne and Payne, 2004), such as official statistics or published research
(Majdfar, F, 2003). Accordingly, this research will focus on various documents, including
publications, academic papers, published interviews, official statistics and written books in
the field of women’s studies and gender rights. Other sources will include feminist
documents published outside of Iran, mostly written by Muslim feminists working in
Western academic institutions, and also documents published in national and local
academic archives in Iran.
With the dominance of the empiricist and positivist perspective in the field of research
methods in human sciences, researchers generally intended to collect data for their research
projects through implementing surveys. Mainstream research tradition in human sciences
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in general, and social sciences in particular, emphasizes quantitative research methods.
Therefore, other research methods, like documentary methods, have almost been
overlooked by scientists and researchers. Most parts of textbooks on research methods
belong to discussions about traditional research methods, like interviews, surveys, and
participant observation, and there is little space for discussion about other research
methods, like documentary and library methods (Scott 1990: 1). Indeed, the documentary
research method has not generally been recognized by scientists as an accepted
independent research method, which can be used as the main or principle method in a
project. This method is usually used by researchers to supplement data collected from
traditional research methods, like surveys and in-depth interviews. This is because it is
supposed that for producing something original, the data must be new. However, we can
also do an original research using old data (Hakim 1982). While traditional research
methods like surveys and interviews have already been tested and have been proved as
respected scientific methods, they are not the only available ones, nor are they more
convenient and cost effective than other methods. Research shows that the documentary
method is as good and sometimes even more cost effective than traditional research
methods (Mogalakwe 2009). Indeed, the documentary method is a reliable and acceptable
research method, which follows scientific rules and requires strong adherence to research
ethics (Ibid).
The documentary and library method is used when a researcher intends to study past events
or study the occurrence of present events he/she cannot personally eyewitness. At this time,
documentary sources provide “mediate or indirect access,” as opposed to “proximate or
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direct access,” to the events and practices that are to be studied (Scott 1990). When you
have to refer to past events or you cannot directly witness whole parts of present events
you wish to study, it becomes necessary to have indirect access to those events through
reviewing related documents. In contrast, proximate or direct access to the required data
for research is provided mostly through implementing traditional research methods, like
interviews and participant observation.
A document can be defined as an artifact, which includes an inscribed text. A document is
a written text, which is produced by individuals or groups during their everyday practices
(Scott 1990). It can be considered independent from its writer or the context of its
production (Jary and Jary 1991). There are two kinds of documents used in the
documentary and library research method: primary documents and secondary documents.
Primary documents have been written by people who directly experienced an event and
provided their eyewitness accounts of the event we intend to study. Secondary documents
have been produced by those who did not directly experience the occurrence of events;
they were not present in the scene and have received or read eyewitness accounts of an
event (Bailey 1994: 194). For instance, the research studies done by Ziba Mir-Hosseini on
Iranian Islamic feminism, including her interviews with traditional and neo-traditional
jurists, as well as reformist scholars, are among primary documents. Studies done by Haleh
Afshar, Nayereh Tohidi, Mahboobeh Sharuiat-Razavi on Islamic feminism in other
Muslim countries, development of reformist discourse in Iran, the future of Islamic
feminism, and Islamic perspectives toward women’s issues are all among secondary
sources.
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Data collected from the documentary method should be handled scientifically the same
way as gathered data in other research methods. Scott (1990: 19-35) has introduced quality
control criteria for handling data collected through the documentary research method.
These criteria include authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. These
criteria are interdependent and a researcher should regard all of them to ensure the high
quality of documentary sources. Authenticity refers to whether a document has integrity,
is genuine, and is of trustworthy and reliable origin. The researcher must be sure that the
evidence he or she is consulting is exactly what it appears or purports to be.
Regarding the authenticity of documents in this research, I have relied on those documents
that were published by dependable research institutes and organizations in and outside of
Iran. For instance, I have referred to the interviews of reformists and jurists on women’s
issues, which have been published by reliable research centers like Islamic Propagation
Office of Qom Seminaries and Kiyan magazine in Tehran. Also, I have referred to
discussions about the various aspects of Islamic feminism published in dependable
international academic journals, as well as reliable national academic journals, Iran.
Credibility of information refers to whether a document is free from distortion and error.
The researcher must be assured that the evidence he or she is consulting is factual. He or
she must be assured that the document was not intentionally altered to mislead the
researcher nor was it prepared for the special benefit of the researcher. Regarding the issue
of credibility in this research, I have avoided using reporters’ opinions and analyses about
the reformist and traditional discourse, gender relations, and women’s issues published in
national newspapers or broadcasted in TV programs. This is because TV programs and
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national newspapers in Iran have been accused of altering documents for their political
purposes. Rather, to establish the credibility of research, I have used documents published
by independent researchers and independent research institutes, which were not involved
in fraudulent activities to distort information for their benefits.
Representativeness refers to whether the document that has been chosen for the research is
representative of the totality of the pertinent documents. In other words, it refers to whether
the consulted document is typical of its kind. This research talks about the influences of
reformist discourse on the development of Islamic feminism in Iran, as well as the
contention between reformist and traditional discourses on women’s issues. As a
representative reference of the reformist discourse, I have referred to Soroush’s 3 theories.
His ideas of “essentials and accidentals in religion”, “expansion of Prophetic experience”,
“maximal and minimal religiosity”, and “historical and contextual interpretation of sacred
texts” have shaped the basic foundations of reformist discourse Iran. Some reformists have
proposed similar ideas and some others have developed Soroush’s theories within the
reformist discourse. Also, Soroush’s reformist ideas have been greatly used by Iranian
Muslim feminists in developing Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. Iranian Muslim
feminists proposed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from a feminist perspective
based on the new ideas developed by Soroush and his companions within the reformist
discourse. Hence, Soroush’s ideas can be seen as the representative of reformist discourse,
which have greatly influenced the development of Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. As a
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representative of neo-traditionalist and traditionalist discourse, I mostly referred to
Ayatollah Motahhari’s and Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s opinions. Mutahhari was one of
the most famous Shiʼa jurists in the pre-revolutionary and the early years of Islamic
revolution in Iran. He mainly expressed his ideas about gender relations and women’s
rights in his book, The System of Women’s rights in Islam, which was followed by the
majority of contemporary jurists in Iran as the reference of their discussion for women’s
rights in Islam. Most traditional, as well as neo-traditional, jurists have accepted
Mutahhari’s definition and explanation of human rights in general and women’s rights in
particular in Islam. Also, I have referred to Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi’s ideas as a
representative of traditionalist discourse on women’s rights in contemporary Iran.
Ayatollah Makarem has accepted Ayatollah Mutahhari’s standpoint on women’s rights and
gender relation. Although his opinions are mostly defined within the traditionalist
discourse, which considers Islamic law eternal and immutable, he considers the possibility
of modification in Islamic laws under the specific kinds of conditions. He defines three sets
of conditions under which an Islamic law can be modified. Therefore, at least a few aspects
of his opinions can also be classified within the neo-traditionalist discourse, which
considers the possibility of change in Islamic law according to the current demands of
society. On the other hand, his opinions are in line with the government’s policies on
women’s rights and gender issues. The Islamic government of Iran defends the definition
of women’s right in traditionalist discourse, as opposed to its definition in the reformist
discourse.
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The forth criterion in assessing the quality of a document relates to the meaning of the
document. Meaning refers to whether the document is comprehensible and clear. The final
purpose of investigating a document is to understand the significance and meaning of what
the document contains (Scott 1990: 28). A document can have two kinds of meaning: literal
or face value meaning, and interpretative meaning. In a literal understanding, the researcher
only looks to the face value meaning of a text and reconstructs the significance of the text
from its literal meaning. In an interpretative understanding, the researcher looks to the
context from which the document was produced and reconstructs the meaning of the
document by making a link between the text and its context. In other words, an
interpretative meaning of a document is a product of the researcher’s interpretation of the
relation between the document and its contexts. Hence, one important point in using
documentary sources is how to make inferences about the matters in a document through
analyzing the contexts of document other than looking to the factual assertions in the
document (Platt 1981). In this research, in addition to relying on the literal meaning of
texts, I have interpreted the meaning of documents on women’s rights within two main
discourses in which discussions about women’s issues have been produced. Discussions
on women’s rights produced by traditional jurists have been interpreted within the
traditionalist discourse and discussions on gender rights, and women’s issues produced by
reformist and feminist scholars have been interpreted within reformist discourse.
Moreover, occasionally, researchers combine two or more research methods in their
studying of the same phenomenon in order to augment the validity and reliability of their
research. This method is known as “method triangulation” (Grix 2001). For instance, they
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may enhance documentary information with in-depth interviews by those who are familiar
with the phenomenon under investigation. Interviews can help a researcher to attain a more
comprehensive understanding of the under-studied documents and become knowledgeable
about the conflicting interpretations of the same event presented by key informants (Hakim
1987). While interviews with key informants of the Islamic feminist movement in Iran
have not been conducted in this research, I have referred to interviews that have already
been done with both reformists and traditional jurists regarding the status of women in
Islam. These interviews have clarified the standpoint of both reformist and traditionalist
discourses on women’s issues.

CHAPTER II: ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN IRAN
Feminist Movements in Iran:
The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 changed the political structure from a secular
monarchy to an Islamic government and put clergies at the top of the political hierarchy.
Although at the first years of shaping the new fledgling Islamic government in Iran both
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religious and non-religious groups had their seats in Iran’s legislative body in a pluralistic
political circumstance, clergies gradually took control of most positions in political
structure and established a national Islamic constitution at the legislative council. The
Islamic Republic of Iran considered Islamic jurisprudence as the main basis of civil and
social codes and compelled Iranian people to obey a set of Islamic laws. Under the name
of an Islamic ideology, the government put pressure on women, through restricting their
freedom and depriving them of some parts of their citizen rights (Ahmadi 2006). Afsaneh
Najmabadi called these years after the Islamic revolution in Iran for women, “yeas of
hardship, years of growth” (Najmabadi 1995). Although women were in a suffering
situation, they always attempted and struggled to regain their rights and oppose the
dominance of clergies in the past thirty years of Islamic government longevity. During
these years, Iranian women with different religious, social and cultural backgrounds,
whether religious or non-religious, conservative or liberal, rich or poor, educated or
illiterate, tried to get back the grounds they lost through the implementation of monolithic
religious policies in Iran (Moghissi 1999: 11).
Because of political pressure in Iran in the early years of the Islamic revolution, feminist
activism was mostly restricted to the activities of women living abroad. Iranian secular
women living outside the country tried to advocate for women’s rights inside Iran. In later
decades, the decrease of political pressure in Iran led the feminist movement to be followed
by secular women inside the country. Both of these groups, secular activists in and outside
of Iran, have tried not just to regain women’s political and social rights, but also to draw
the attention of the international world to the situation of Iranian women. Although these
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activities were slightly successful in publicizing Iranian women’s painful circumstances to
the world, they could not achieve adequate success in bringing freedom for women inside
Iran as an Islamic country (Ahmadi 2006: 5-13).
One important reason for the little success of secular activism in bringing freedom for
Iranian women was the barriers put forth by the government and jurists, who were
commanding over all state institutions, in front of the secular activists. The Islamic
government of Iran labeled secular discourse as an anti-religious and Western discourse,
and barricaded its development within the Iranian religious culture. Moreover, the religious
culture and social context of Iranian society did not accept secular feminist discourse as an
authentic means for restoring women’s rights.
Also, secular feminism was not thoroughly successful in drawing Western feminists’
attention to the condition of women in Iran because of the new wave of Islamophobia,
which was spread in the world after the Islamic revolution in Iran. This trend of
Islamophobia reached its climax after September eleventh, which made Western feminists
not pay enough attention to women’s struggles in Iran and other Islamic countries when
constructing a new feminist discourse. Also, in recent decades, international concerns
about the nuclear and missile program of Iran turned Iranian feminist activism to a marginal
issue in international dialogues.
Therefore, it seems that a powerful religious movement from within the country was
needed to be accepted by the majority of the Iranian Muslim population, and to be able to
built support for women’s rights. In this regard, Iranian Muslim women have struggled to
start a feminist movement with the purpose of reconstructing the notion of gender within

25

the Islamic discourse. Muslim feminists have tried to oppose the monolithic powerful
structure and the clergy’s traditional readership of Islam; they have challenged traditional
interpretation of Islamic theological and legal sources to begin a new tendency in Islamic
feminism (Afshar 1998).
Not only did Iranian Muslim feminists challenge the traditional interpretation of Islamic
legal sources, but also they demanded more freedom in their social, economic, and political
life. This resulted from feminist endeavors; not only have women not disappeared from
public life after the Islamic revolution of 1979, but they also have been able to attain
considerable accomplishments in various fields of industrial and educational works, artistic
creation, and sports activities (Najmabadi 1995). Feminist activism has considerably
developed after the presidential election of 1997, concurrent with the beginning of the
reformist movement in Iran. As a result of political freedom in Iran following President
Mohammad Khatami’s election in 1997, we can witness an increase in the social and
political presence of modern women, and a call for equal civil rights from Iranian
reformists and feminist activists. Muslim women published feminist journals like Zanan
and Payam-e Hajar and discussed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from a
feminist perspective. The development of feminist discussions in the intellectual
atmosphere of Iran have stimulated theological schools in the Qom, the center of political
and religious power of Shi’i clerics in Iran, to run research institutes for discussion on
globalized, modern realities pertaining to women’s issues. Clerics also published a journal
for women entitled Payam-e Zan to explain their position on gender rights and answer
questions proposed by Muslim feminists. Consequently, Muslim feminists could acquire
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the possibility of dialogue with clerics concerning Islamic jurisprudence and the issue of
women’s rights in Islam. During last decade, some Muslim feminists have continued their
activities in collaboration with research centers affiliated with the Qom seminaries
(Houzeh-ye elmie-ye Qom) and some others published their papers on gender rights in
various academic journals. Mohammad Taghi Karami (2014) 4 believes that Islamic
feminism has increasingly developed after 2005 in Iran. He argues that Islamic feminism
had not been taken seriously as an influential discourse by Iranian feminist activists before
2005. In fact, it was during the last decade that most feminist activists have paid more
attention to Islamic feminism and developed their feminist ideas within an Islamic context. 5
Islamic Feminism in the Middle East:
The Islamic feminist movement was not just restricted to Iran. We can see the development
of feminist movements in other Islamic countries in the Middle East. Azza M. Karam
(2011: 202) classifies feminist movements in the Middle East and Arab countries into three
streams in a continuum: secular (understood as a non-religious discourse), religious
(largely, but not entirely, expressed in Islamic terms), and the Islamist movement (which
is defending of an Islamic political ideology).
Azza M. Karam states that secular feminists generally try to represent a faith-based
discourse. Some secular activists are not antagonistic toward the religion; in contrast, they
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are devout persons in their personal life and introduce themselves as Muslims. On the other
hand, there are secular activists who do not believe in religious movements and presume
religion itself as the main cause of oppression against women. These secular activists
usually do not like to collaborate with their religious sisters in feminist endeavors. They
believe that becoming involved in religion can create division between their ranks. Their
efforts had a considerable effect on recapturing women’s rights in some religious countries.
However, barely, in the Middle East and Arab World, is there any admiration and
verification from religious circles for those working outside of the circle, like secular
activists (Ibid).
On the other side of the feminist activism continuum, there are Islamic activists. Muslim
feminists in the Middle East acknowledge that women are under oppression in Islamic
countries. They see Islamic reality as an appropriate option, which can release both men
and women from suffering and oppression. For them, the main reason for the current
injustice against women in Islamic countries is society’s lack of subordination to Islam.
Because Arab countries are not following God’s law, we can see many problems in social,
cultural, and political structures of Islamic societies. Therefore, they believe that the only
way for removing the cruelty and injustice against women in Islamic countries is obeying
God’s law and being subordinate to Islamic rules. It is because God’s order can always
guarantee justice and fairness toward both men and women (Ibid 203).
There is another feminist movement in the Arab world, known as the religious feminist
movement, which falls in the middle of the feminist continuum between secular and
Islamic movements. Religious activists are distinguished from Islamist activists, as they do
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not advocate for any kind of political ideologies and separate themselves from the
fundamentalist interpretation of religion, which some Islamic activists may advocate by
following the shariʼa. They support of a set of rules, which is a combination of international
legal instructions and all faith traditions (Ibid).
In a comparison with the classification of feminist activism in the Arab world introduced
by Karam (2011), we can classify feminist activism in Iran into two types: Islamic and
secular. Since more than 98 percent of the Iranian population is Muslim (Vahedi 2010: 20),
other religions remain in the minority in Iranian society. After the Islamic revolution in
Iran, followers of other religions became more deprived of their citizenship rights than
Muslims; they always have tried to acquire their rights as Iranian citizens. Such endeavors
were implemented by men more often than women. Therefore, the feminist movement was
a very marginal issue among followers of religions other than Islam, such as Jews,
Christian, and Zoroastrian Iranians (Mehrangiz Kar 1993: 16).
We can witness the presence of two other sorts of feminist movements in Iran: secular and
Islamic. As mentioned already, secular activists were slightly successful in drawing
international attention to the situation of Iranian women. Moreover, like in the Arab world,
in which there is almost no praise from religious circles for those who advocate for
women’s rights outside of these circles (Karam 2011: 202), we can observe a similar trend
toward secular activism among the Iranian Muslim population. Religious culture and the
social context of Iranian society did not consider secular feminism as an authentic means
for restoring Iranian women’s rights. In addition to having less popularity among the
majority of the Iranian population, secular feminism has experienced much political
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pressure imposed by the Islamic government. The Islamic Republic of Iran has constantly
accused secular feminist discourse of being a Western discourse, which supports Western
values in contrast with Iranian religious and cultural values.
Meanwhile, Iranian Muslim women have developed a feminist discourse from within an
Islamic context, under the name of Islamic feminism. This discourse has had the potential
to be accepted by the majority of the Iranian Muslim population, as well as to be immune
from the governmental labeling as Western and secular discourse.
Islamic feminism in Iran has considerable differences from Islamic feminism in the Arab
world. Muslim feminists in Arab countries have tried to refer to the Islamic texts as the
only authentic sources for emancipating women from oppression. They believe that God’s
law, which was articulated in the sacred texts, is just and fairly ubiquitous; and the main
reason for any injustice that has been implemented against women in the Arab world is
disobeying God’s law (Karam 2011: 202). In this regard, Muslim feminists in the Arab
world have referred to a traditional and classical interpretation of religious texts to find an
appropriate solution for their problems and restore their complete rights.
On the other hand, Iranian Muslim feminists do not think that a traditional interpretation
of Islamic sources can resolve the modern problems Muslim women are experiencing in
their daily activities. They believe that religious texts, as well as sacred sources, require
reinterpretation from a modern perspective to accommodate modern, globalized realities
in Islamic countries. Accordingly, they have tried to go beyond a traditional interpretation
of religious texts in order to develop a new feminist paradigm on women’s issues and
reconstruct Islamic notions on gender from a modern perspective.
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Islamic Feminism in Iran:
Women are calling for equal rights and participating in political structures of the Muslim
world. They look for social, political, and cultural changes to improve women’s situation
in Islamic societies. Everywhere in Islamic countries, Muslim and secular activists, plus
those who have political powers, always try to find suitable solutions for modern problems
caused by the changed status of women in Muslim societies. Meanwhile, as women’s issues
turned to an essential element of modern Islamic discourse, a new generation of feminists
was generated in Islamic countries, who named themselves Muslim feminists. Moghissi
states that feminist activism has encompassed many brands, including religious and nonreligious, conservative and liberal, heterosexual and homosexual, white and non-white,
individualistic and community-oriented. Hence, it seems rather superfluous to name a new
brand of feminism identified by others or that self-identified as Islamic feminism (Moghissi
1999: 125).
In general, Islamic feminism can be defined as “a feminist practice and discourse expressed
within an Islamic paradigm” (Bardan 2002: 17). Islamic feminism is not a specific
characteristic of the West or East. It is an endeavor by Muslim women all over the world
in restoring their rights, whether they are in countries with a majority Muslim population
or from old established minority societies (Ibid: 3).
Maybe it is redundant to identify a new kind of feminist activism in Arab countries under
the name of Islamic feminism. However, since the feminist movement, which has been
developed by Muslim women in Iran, is considerably different from the feminist
movements in other Islamic countries, we can categorize it as a new feminist movement
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under the name of Islamic feminism. Iranian Muslim women have looked to the notion of
gender in Islam in a radical way. They have tried to present a new interpretation of sacred
texts and Islamic principals in order to combat gender-biased policies and to advocate for
equal legal rights. This movement of reinterpreting Islamic principles and sacred texts from
a feminist perspective is unprecedented in the Islamic world. In this regard, Ziba MirHosseini remarked, “After three decades of Islamic revolution in Iran, we are now
observing a growth in feminist readings of the holy texts which is unique among all Muslim
countries” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 12).
Muslim feminists in Iran believe that some parts of religious and sacred texts, especially
some verses in the Qurʼan, cannot be employed in the modern period; those parts of sacred
texts are required to be reinterpreted from a modern perspective. Accordingly, they
proposed a new feminist paradigm on women’s issues, and reconstructed Islamic notions
on gender from a modern perspective. The result of these feminist endeavors was a lively
discussion over women’s role in Islam and the development of a novel understanding of
women’s social, political, and spiritual status in an Islamic society. According to Esposito,
Islamic feminism in Iran developed a tendency to reconsider the notion of gender in Islam
in a new and radical way. He pointed out that Iran is a good case study of not just rethinking
and reinterpreting Islamic legal sources, but also of reinterpreting and personally
investigating sacred texts (Esposito 1998: introduction).
The principal methodology of Iranian Islamic feminism is the methodology of classical
Islam. Like other Islamic thinkers, Iranian Muslim feminists try to find appropriate answers
for their questions through interpreting religious and sacred texts, especially the Qurʼan
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(tafsir), as well as conducting independent research in various religious sources (ijtihad).
Moreover, Muslim feminists in Iran try to use methods and tools of other disciplines, such
as sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, and linguistic studies, when interpreting
religious texts. They also put more emphasis on their life experiences as women, which is
different from that of men in their interpretation of religion. Muslim feminists, besides
Western and secular feminists, confirmed that most classical and also post-classical
interpretation of religious texts is only based on the male’s experiences and man-centered
questions. In order to reach an egalitarian interpretation of religious texts, it is necessary to
reconsider those interpretations from a female perspective (Bardan 2002: 3).
Influential Factors in Developing Islamic Feminism in Iran:
One of the main factors that has helped Iranian Muslim women to develop their feminist
ideas was the result of endeavors Iranian Muslim reformers made in reconsidering the
traditional interpretation of sacred texts. The new perception of Islam, introduced by
Abdolkarim Soroush and other Muslim scholars, has helped feminist women to present a
new interpretation of gender issues in Islam. The new ideas of essentials and accidentals
of history, expansion of the prophetic experience, and the historical and hermeneutic
interpretation of sacred texts paved the way for feminist activists to call for the necessity
of rethinking religious sources from a feminist perspective. Those women gathered in
reformist circles at the Kiyan Institute 6 in Tehran, and published feminist journals like
Zanan, in which they discussed women’s rights and gender roles in Islam. They applied
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Soroush’s ideas, as well as other reformers’ opinions, to their feminist discourse and
followed reformers’ new approaches in interpreting religious texts. Emphasizing reformist
ideas has helped Iranian Muslim feminists to integrate their faith with their feminist
tendencies and has made it possible for them to develop a feminist discourse within an
Islamic framework (Mir-Hosseini, 1996: 217-37).
Another factor that played an important role in expanding Iranian feminist discourse was
the tendency of Iranian Muslim women to adopt postmodern ideas in their discussion of
women’s rights. Iranian Muslim feminists used postmodern concepts and theories to
reformulate Islamic notions and law from a feminist perspective. Although it is generally
agreed that any Islamic movement shows a trend toward a mediaeval Islamic period, the
Islamic feminist movement is a modern movement using modern and postmodern ideas in
its discourse (Amir Arjomand, 2004: 9-22). The Islamic feminist movement is barely
understood as a reaction to modernity; in contrast, it is a natural consequence of
reorganizing Islamic societies from a modern perspective. Iranian feminists integrated
postmodern ideas and employed postmodern noetic tools like optimism, pluralism, drive
for self-knowledge and the principle of diversity in their discussion. They rejected the
essential nature of women as an important postmodern principle and adapted to the axiom
of multiple truths, multiple realities, and multiple roles.
One of the most important features of postmodern feminism is analyzing language from a
postmodern view as a complicated mechanism for institutional control. Postmodern
feminism criticizes not only the structure of power in relations of domination, but also the
ideological forces, which maintain these relations of domination (Butler and W. Scott
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1992; Donaldson 1992). Western feminists, using the perceptual tools of postmodern
feminism, have criticized the language of monotheistic religions as being gender biased in
favor of men’s desires. They have claimed that theologians and jurists’ biased
interpretation of God represented a masculinized picture of God, which makes women
inferior to men and justifies institutional oppression against women (Ahmadi 2006).
Iranian Muslim feminists employed a similar postmodern perspective in their criticism of
the Arabic language as the language of Islamic sacred sources. They emphasized the
function of language in creating and sustaining the relations of dominance and institutional
control. They tried to expand the breadth of their interpretation of Islamic sources from a
feminist perspective to a new linguistic construction of the Arabic language. This new
construction of language enabled Iranian Islamic feminists to challenge the literal meaning
and traditional interpretation of sacred texts. Employing postmodern critiques of language
in their discussion, Iranian Muslim feminists could unveil the role of language in
maintaining a gender-biased interpretation of sacred sources.
Two main sources made Iranian Muslim women familiar with postmodern concepts and
theories: reformist discourse and secular feminist discourse. Iranian reformers, as well as
secular feminists, have greatly used postmodern concepts in their own discussions. Iranian
Muslim feminists, through connection with reformers and secular feminists, became
familiar with postmodern ideas and applied these ideas in their Islamic feminist discourse.
Using postmodern concepts and theories, Iranian Muslim feminists could prepare a
scientific foundation for their discussion on the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts from
a feminist perspective.
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In addition to the reformist movement and postmodern ideas, the globalization of women’s
strides for equality and justice paved the way for Iranian Muslim feminists to develop their
own feminist discourse. The processes of globalization have changed the structures of
international trade, transportation, migration, communication, and information transfer
through new, electronic technologies. These processes have brought multilingual and
multicultural individuals who pursue various fluid identities (Giddens 1994). Indeed, the
processes of globalization have made individuals and communities all over the world more
integrated during past decades. This integration has made women familiar with the
characteristics of feminist movements in various societies, and has strengthened the global
consciousness of feminist activism on gender roles and women’s rights. The processes of
globalization have brought a great awareness for women of various political interpretations
of women’s rights, and have helped women to rethink their own society’s policies and
norms. According to Tohidi, “As people became aware of various political systems in the
world through the processes of globalization, they are less interested in accepting their own
traditional political systems and gender regimes. . . . Not only those who left their countries,
but also those who live in their original home country are now more likely to evaluate their
own lives by comparing their rights, responsibilities, and restrictions with other people in
a global context.” (Tohidi 2002: 1)
In recent decades, we have been witnessing an increase of feminist activities all over the
world. Feminist conferences held by the United Nations after 1975 and other similar
meetings sponsored by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increased
cooperation among feminist activists from various societies. In this regard, after the 1995
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world conference on feminism, which was held in Beijing, a significant number of
international feminist communities and women-oriented organizations and NGOs have
developed their activities in Iran. These international feminist communities and
organizations have put Iranian feminists in close connection with other feminist activists
in Western and Muslim countries.

CHAPTER III: MAIN DISCOURSES PERTAINING TO ISLAMIC FEMINISM IN
IRAN
Reformist Discourse:
Radical attitudes toward a traditional understanding of religious texts regarding women’s
issues, introduced by Iranian Muslim feminists, are based on the reformers’ ideas about the
necessity of reinterpreting Islamic sacred texts from a modern perspective. In developing
their feminist discourse, Iranian Muslim feminists followed the ideas of Iranian reformist
thinkers as the pioneers of reinterpretation of the Qurʼan and other sacred sources. One of
the most influential figures among Iranian reformists, whose ideas had considerable effects
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on feminist scholars and activists, was Abdolkarin Soroush. Soroush was introduced by
Robin Wright and some other American journalist as the Martin Luther of Islam for his
novel, reformist ideas about Islamic knowledge (Wright, R. 2000: 139).
Iranian reformists have gathered at the Kiyan Institute, as an intellectual and cultural
institute in Tehran, around Abdolkarinm Soroush. They have published their reformist
ideas about social, cultural, and political structures of Islamic societies, as well as their
feminist discussions, in Kiyan magazine. Furthermore, feminist scholars gradually joined
the circle of reformist intellectuals at the Kiyan institute. They employed reformist ideas,
developed by Soroush and other reformers at the Kiyan Institute, in their feminist discourse
and proposed the necessity of reinterpreting sacred texts regarding women’s issues from a
feminist perspective.
In fact, Zananʼs shariʼa discourse was not an abstract discourse, rather it was part of a new
trend, which developed within a political and religious foundation by Iranian Muslim
reformers. This novel trend, which can be best described as a post-fundamentalist
discourse, was the newest debate in post-Khomeini in Iran. This debate did not challenge
only the term “gender” in Shariʼa, but also defied the discourse of the Islamic Republic on
the condition of the political and Islamic state (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 315-16). 7
Among various reformist ideas, Soroush’s theories had the most influence on shaping
Iranian feminist discourse. While Soroush, alongside some other reformist intellectuals in
Iran, has not subscribed to the gender equality discourse, his reformist ideas on the
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interpretation of sacred texts and Islamic knowledge have enabled Iranian religious women
to attune their faith with their feminist ideas. Soroush developed his reformist ideas in
various disciplines, including theology, philosophy, sociology, and history of religion, as
well as in gender studies and feminism. Soroush, against most of other Iranian reformers,
was able to organize his reformist ideas in the form of coherent theories. These coherent
theories were greatly used by Iranian women in shaping the underlying philosophy of
Islamic feminist discourse Iran. Indeed, Soroush’s reformist theories stimulated Iranian
Muslim feminists to discuss of women’s rights in Islam and propose the necessity of
reinterpretation of sacred text from a feminist perspective. In this regard, I refer to MirHosseini, who mentioned the influences of Soroush’s ideas on feminist discourse.
“I did not have any bright idea about how Soroush stimulated feminist women in
Zanan. After I read his book about the essential and accidental in religion, I found
that I have to shift my focus. Actually, it was not just his idea about gender that
inspired women in Zanan, but also it was his new approach to the interpretation of
sacred texts and his new conceptualization of Islam that authorized women to
discuss gender equality. By now, I can see how his new interpretation of sacred
texts opened up a new space for radical reformism in gender subjects, among other
issues.” (Mir-Hosseini 1996: 238)
Soroush’s new ideas on the theology of Islam, the hermeneutic interpretation of the
prophet’s tradition, and the philosophy of Islamic law and shariʼa have influenced Iranian
Muslim scholars, especially those working in Zanan. One of his most influential reformist
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ideas that shaped Iranian Islamic feminism was his discussion about the meaning of
“essential” and “accidental” in Islam.
Soroush argued that, on the one hand, there are essential parts (zati) in the Qurʼan, which
are unchangeable and ever-lasting. These parts are the main foundations of Islam. Without
them, Islam is no longer Islam. On the other hand, there are some parts in the Qurʼan that
were shaped by the society and time in which the prophet was born and raised. He called
those parts accidentals (arazi) (Soroush 1989: 4-19).
Soroush described his criterion in separating essential parts from accidental parts in the
Qurʼan: the history of Islam is contingent as all other histories. My criterion in separating
essential from accidental is based on this knowledge about things that could have happened
in other ways. For example, the principle of oneness and uniqueness of God (tawheed) is
an essential part of the Qurʼan because it could not have happened otherwise and without
it, Islam is not actually Islam. However, it was an accidental of history that Muhammad
was born in Arabia and therefore the language of the Qurʼan became the Arabic language,
which shaped the main conceptual framework of the Qurʼan (Soroush 1999: 21).
Soroush argued that because the prophet was Arab, his usage of notion and words in
transferring God’s word to the people was confined to Arabic culture and language.
Therefore, if the prophet had been born in another place besides Arabia, such as Greece or
Iran, his language and also his way of thinking would be different. In addition, if he had
been born in a place other than Arabia, Qurʼanic rules on social subjects would be different
and hence the Qurʼan would be a different book in some parts, in those which are
accidentals. Therefore, the Qurʼan is a product of a certain place and certain time. To
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support his argument, he referred to the verses of the Qurʼan to show how the issues of
some parts of the Qurʼan would be completely different if the language of the Qurʼan was
not Arabic or the prophet had lived somewhere besides Arabia (Soroush 1989, 4-19). In
his opinion, all of the events that have taken place in the history of Islam, which could have
happened in other ways, are accidentals. These parts must not be included in the domain
of faith (Soroush 2009: 89).
To have access to the core message of religion, a believer should engage in a cultural
translation of past events that happened in the early years of Revelation, to the present time.
A believer’s ijtihad should be the historical translation of linguistic, socio-cultural,
political, and economic circumstances from past to present. This historical translation is
necessary for each Muslim to distinguish accidental from essential parts of religion.
In other words, Muslims should differentiate “historical Islam” from the “spirit of Islam”.
Soroush mentioned fourteen items that can help us in reconstructing historical Islam; these
fourteen items give a clue to distinguish the accidentals from essentials in sacred sources:
“Religion does not have an Aristotelian essence or nature; it is the Prophet who has
certain goals. These goals are religion’s essentials. In order to express and attain
these intentions and to have them understood, the Prophet seeks the assistance of
(1) a particular language, (2) particular concepts and (3) particular methods (fiqh
and ethics). All of this occurs in a particular (4) time and (5) place (geographical
and cultural) and for (6) a particular people with specific physical and mental
capacities.
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The purveyor of religion is faced with specific (7) reactions and (8) questions and,
in response to them, gives (9) specific answers. The flow of religion over the course
of time in turn gives rise to events, moving some people to (10) acquiesce and others
to (11) repudiate. Believers and unbelievers fall into (12) particular relationships
with each other and religion; they fight battles or create civilizations, (13) engage
in comprehending and expanding religious ideas and experiences or (14) wrecking
and undermining them” (Soroush 2009:90-1).
Therefore, the historical events that happened in the early years of Revelation within a
specific time and place, the prophet’s particular language, method, and concepts used for
transferring religion’s essentials to other people, as well as religious ideas about social
orders, are all additions to the essential parts of religion, and must be translated to the
present. Soroush argued that those who ignore the historian and contextual background of
the Qurʼan and other sacred texts in their interpretation turns soon to autocrats who believe
that the shariʼa and Islamic laws are unchangeable (Soroush 2000: 220). Rather, Soroush
believes that shariʼa is silent and its representatives give the voice to it; shariʼa does not
provide invariable answers for all historical problems (Soroush 1995, 34).
In another reformist idea, known as the “expansion of Prophetic experience,” Soroush
provided examples from the Qurʼan to prove that the prophet’s living experience was
humanistic like other Muslims’ living experiences. He concluded that the prophet was a
human like others, so his experience was humanistic. This humanistic experience was
expanded throughout history by other Muslims. In this regard, he provided examples of
how the prophet’s disciples expanded his religious experience in the history and developed
Islamic knowledge (Soroush 1999: 21). Soroush referred to the speaking of Jalal al-Din
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Muhammad Balkhi, known as Rumi, one of the most famous Islamic Sufis in the thirteenth
century, to show how the prophet’s experience has expanded during the history of Islam.
According to Rumi, revelation (wahy) did not stop with the death of the prophet. It was not
just the prophet who received revelation; rather, Sufis have also received various kinds of
revelation from the God. While Rumi believes that Sufis have also received revelation, he
does not consider them as prophets because they do not have specific responsibilities and
duties that God only put on the shoulders of prophets.
Soroush argued that Sufis have added to Islamic knowledge and practices. For instance, he
said that Rumi added other forms of prayers like sa’ma 8 to the traditional forms of worships
in Islam. Soroush considered masnavi 9 as a supplementary to the Qurʼan, and said that
Rumi added the notion of love to the Islamic literature. Soroush argued that Rumi defined
the relationship of humans and God in a new form of lover-beloved relationship. This kind
of relationship between the God and His creatures was not defined in the Qurʼan. Rather,
the Qurʼan defined the relationship of God and believers based on hope and fear: hope to
God’s mercy and fear of God’s punishment. 10

8

Sa’ma literally means “listening” and is considered as a Sufi ceremony performed as dhikr (remembrance
of the names of God). Sa’ma is a kind of worship, which often includes playing instruments, singing,
recitation of the names of God, dancing, recitation of poetry, wearing symbolic attires and other rituals.
9

Masnavi, or masnavi-I ma’navi, is an extensive spiritual poem written by Rumi, mostly in Persian. It
consists of six books, which are known as one of the most influential sources in Islamic Sufism and
mysticism. In this document, Rumi explains how to reach to the goal of being in true love with God. He
discovers various aspects of lover-beloved mysticism and its spiritual joy.
10

Siamak Dehghanpour did this interview with Abdolkarim Soroush under the subject of “Mawlawi and the
Persian Qurʼan”. This interview was broadcasted by Voice of America on 05/10/2014
http://ir.voanews.com/media/all/horizon/latest.html?z=1566
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Based on this explanation, Islamic knowledge is not just restricted to what was stated in
the sacred texts. The prophet’s disciples and other Muslims like Sufis have added to this
knowledge during the history of Islam. In extracting Islamic laws, we should also take into
account that other documents have been added to the Islamic primary sources. Hence,
Islamic laws are not immutable, since they are not only based on what was stated in the
Qurʼan and Sunna.
We can witness similar reformist ideas about the interpretation of religious texts, which
have been developed by other Iranian Muslim reformers at the Kiyan institute. For instance,
Alireza Alavitabar expanded Soroush’s theory about the accidentals of history to a vast
degree, which covered most parts of the Qurʼan; he said that not only Arabic language and
culture, but also scientific happenings, historical events, and many stories in the Qurʼan
and the prophet’s tradition, lay in the realm of accidentals and do not apply to this time
(Alavitabar, A. 2003). Said Amir Arjomand stated that there was not just the entire body
of sacred law as an accidental part of the Qurʼan; also, the culture that has been extended
around it should be considered as an historically contingent figure of sacred texts (Amir
Arjomand 2002: 719-21). Regarding the historical and contextual interpretation of sacred
texts, Malekian argued that we should look to the Qurʼan and Sunna from an historical
perspective. We should ask what the prophet wanted to do with the help of the Qurʼan and
Sunna in the specific historical and social circumstances of the early years of Islam. We
should be aware of the main reasons behind his behaviors (Malekian 2000).
Indeed, reformist discourse, which has been developed by Islamic intellectuals in Iran,
represents a modern behavior that intends to reconcile feminism, democracy, and other
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modern elements with Islamic faith. Not only Muslim intellectuals, but also some eminent
clerics have called for Islamic reformation (Tohidi 2006: 628). These clergies, as well as
Iranian reformers, have demanded reformulating Islamic concepts from a modern
perspective and substituting traditionalist jurisprudence (fiqh-e sunnati) with dynamic
jurisprudence (fiqh-e pouya) (Ibid). For instance, Saeed-zadeh confirmed that we should
think of modifying the current system of fiqh to prevent obvious oppressions against
women. Islamic laws on the right for divorce, the right for custody, and polygamy should
be reviewed (Saeed zadeh, 1997). Some of these clergies collaborated with reformers at
the Kiyan Institute and were active in Kiyan magazine, as well as in feminist journals like
Zanan and Payam-e Hajar.
Reformist theories regarding the contextual and historical interpretation of sacred texts, the
expansion of prophetic experience, and the essentials and accidentals of history, paved the
way for Iranian Muslim feminists to demand a reformation in interpreting religious texts
from a feminist perspective. Based on these theories, they have argued that those verses in
the Qurʼan that reflect some experiences of Arabic culture and Mohammed’s personal life
were just specific to an historical time in the early years of Islam and are not applicable to
the modern time.
In this regard, Muslim feminists, through independent personal investigation of sacred texts
(ijtihad), have identified many Islamic laws in gender issues as accidentals in Islam, instead
of their current interpretation of being fundamentals in the Iranian legal constitution.
Muslim feminists have provided examples of Islamic laws as specific to the Arab culture
and the prophet’s society. Such rules include the law allowing Muslim men to marry four
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women, the conditions of temporary marriage in Islam, and those rules that give automatic
rights of divorce to men (Ahmadi 2006). For instance, Kazemi declared that polygamy was
prevalent in pre-Islamic Arab society. Islam was not able to resist this tradition and remove
it completely. Hence, in order to support women’s rights, Islam put limitations on
polygamy and changed its conditions. Indeed, polygamy was imposed on Islam by the Arab
culture in the early years of Islam. Now, the social condition has changed. We are now
aware that polygamy produces many problems and disrupts family relationships.
Therefore, polygamy is not permissible at this time (Kazemi 2002).
While Iranian Muslim women made endeavors in demonstrating gender-biased aspects of
Islamic laws, their voices have not considerably been heard by traditional jurists. Women
are still excluded from interpreting religious and sacred sources. One of the main reasons
for this exclusion is the dominance of patriarchal ideology over the thinking mode of
traditional jurists that left little space for women to take part in discussions for extracting
shariʼa ideals from sacred texts. Moreover, traditional jurists did not consider feminist
women as experts in Islamic knowledge. Hence, they did not accept feminist women’s
interpretation of Islamic sources as an authentic and reliable interpretation. However,
traditional jurists could not challenge the new interpretation of Islamic sources on women’s
issues that was introduced by male reformers. They did not mostly accuse reformers as less
educated in Islamic knowledge, since most reformist intellectuals and clergies have already
studied Islamic sciences in academics, as well as in traditional schools in Qom seminaries
(Houzeh-ye elmie-ye Qom). Therefore, reformers were more successful than Iranian
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Muslim women in presenting the modern interpretation of religious texts on women’s
issues and gender rights.
Traditionalist Discourse:
The objective of Iranian Islamist feminism is the pursuit of equality and justice in Islamic
law on gender issues (Lorestani 2003). Iranian Islamist feminists challenge traditional
jurists by presenting new discourses underlying Islamic legal thought. These discourses
can be divided into two types: neo-traditionalist and reformist. Indeed, we can distinguish
three discourses underlying Islamic legal thought Iran. The first is the discourse of classical
fiqh text, known as traditionalist discourse. Traditionalist discourse was developed by
jurists on the basis of biological differences between men and women. This discourse
reflects circumstances of the society in which traditional jurists had lived. In that society,
inequality between men and women was seen as the natural order of things. Patriarchal
structure in that society shaped the world-view of classical jurists in their understanding of
sacred texts.
Gender relations are based on women’s duties in traditionalist discourse. According to MirHosseini, in classical fiqh texts, women are seen as sexual beings, not as social beings; the
only domain in which women’s rights are partly discussed is family law (Mir-Hosseini
2003).
The influence of the patriarchal structure on classical jurists can be best seen in their
interpretation of the marriage contract, which defines women as subject to the male
authority. In classical fiqh text, the logical structure underlying the marriage contract is
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similar to the sale contract. The man pays a dower (Mahr) to the woman to have access to
her sexual and reproductive faculties. Although classical fiqh resembles marriage to the
sale just in the form not in the spirit, it is the logic of the sale contract that underlies the
classical fiqh conception of women’s rights. That is, classical jurists define the main
purpose of marriage as gratification of sexual needs and procreation (Abd Al Ati 1997);
they see women’s sexuality as a commodity, as a subject of the marriage contract. While
there are both moral and legal obligations incumbent on each spouse in the marriage, moral
obligations are unenforceable and marginal to legal obligations, those injunctions based on
the rules of sale.
Fuqahaʼ 11 claim that they derive the ideal model of gender relations, particularly in
marriage, from sacred sources. The influence of the patriarchal structure on the thinking
modes of classical jurists, as well as the exclusion of women from producing religious
knowledge, are two main reasons for the classical interpretation of sacred texts. The
patriarchal ideology, which was an inalienable part of jurists’ lives, left little space for
women to take part in discussions for extracting shariʼa ideals from sacred texts. The
women’s voice is more marginalized in the political life of Muslim society as long as we
move further from the years of Revelation (for more review, see Ahmed, 1992, chapter 4:
“The Transitional Age”). Under the influence of patriarchal ideology, jurists created a
gender-biased philosophical foundation underlying their traditional interpretation of sacred
texts and Islamic legal thought.

11
Fuqahaʼ are Muslim jurists responsible for the development of fiqh, as an Islamic science with its own
specific legal theories and methodology, over the course of centuries.
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Indeed, the epistemological and philosophical foundation of classical legal thought, which
defines women’s status as a fixed and unchangeable issue in fiqh law, is the main reason
for unequal gender relations embedded in traditionalist discourse. Fiqh rulings on gender
rights are based on a set of philosophical and metaphysical assumptions like “women are
created of and for men,” or “God gave women greater sexual desire than men which should
be controlled by men.” Using these assumptions, fugaha’ made women subjugated to men
in marriage and other fiqh rulings regarding gender relations. Defining marriage in a form
of sale contract provides a juristic basis for women’s subjugation to men. In this regard,
fugaha’ granted more freedom to men and set more restrictions for women in marriage
rules. For instance, the Islamic law of marriage permits men to enter more than one
marriage (up to four) at a time, as well as to abolish the marriage contract at will without
the wife’s consent.
Classical jurists not only looked at marriage as a social or private contract (muʼamala), but
also considered it as a ritual/spiritual act (ibadat). Indeed, they did not want to lower the
status of women to a commodity; rather, they considered women as humans. In this regard,
in addition to defining the legal form of marriage in the form of a social contract
(muʼamala), they talked about marriage as an act of worship. It is considered in figh that
those rulings that lie in the realms of ibadat, which regulate relations between God and
humans, are immutable and constant, and those rulings which are in the domain of
muʼamala, which regulate relations between humans, are changeable and subject to rational
explanation. However, classical jurists treated marriage rules and other rulings pertinent to
gender relations, even those in the domain of muʼamala, as immutable and limited to the
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scope of rationalization. They did not define gender relations and women’s status as social
and cultural terms; rather, as divinely ordained subjects based on revelation (wahy), which
has permanent validity and is not subject to change in response to social and political
forces.
In fact, in the Qurʼan, women’s status is not treated as a divinely ordained issue, but as a
changeable social practice (Mir-Hosseini 2003). However, Muslim jurists, rather than
embodying shariʼa ideals in fiqh rules, created God’s law according to their ideal model of
family and gender relations, as a permanent Divine Justice (Sachedina 1999a:29). The
philosophical and metaphysical assumptions underlying fiqh laws cannot be supported by
sacred texts; they are contrary to the voice of revelation (wahy) and Qurʼanic objectives of
bringing justice and fairness for both genders (Wadud 1999, Mernissi 1991, Hassan 1987).
Muslim scholars concluded that these assumptions are rooted in the patriarchal structure of
pre-Islamic Arabia, which continued to the Islamic era (Ahmed 1992, Mernissi 1991).
Neo-traditionalist Discourse:
Another discourse underlying Islamic legal thought in Iran is the neo-traditionalist or
modern discourse. Neo-traditionalist discourse was started in last decades of the nineteenth
century and was more developed in the early years of twentieth century. This discourse is
known as the modern discourse in Islamic legal codes. The encounter of modern nationstates with waves of modernity changed gender roles and women’s status in Islamic
countries. Neo-traditional jurists tried to find a solution for modern problems emerged in
Islamic countries because of the changed status of women. Their aspiration for creating
gender equality in Islamic law is not based on the Western discourse; rather, it is based on
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the demand of Muslim women for freedom and justice in their everyday lives in the
twentieth century.
On the one hand, neo-traditionalists tried to resist the emergence of Western values and
lifestyles, which was supported by secular elites in Islamic countries. On the other hand,
they wanted to support gender equality and accommodation of traditional fiqh rules with
the modern discourses on women’s status and gender roles. The result of their efforts was
arguing for gender equality in some parts of Islamic laws and rejecting reformation in some
others (for more review see, Mir-Hosseini 1999, Mutahhari 1991, Siddiqi 1952).
In order to defend the fiqh notion of gender, as well as support equality in gender rights,
neo-traditionalists changed the assumptions and theories underlying classical fiqh texts,
and defended of the theory of “naturalness of shariʼa law.” 12 For instance, they did not
accept this classical assumption that “women were created of and for men.” Instead, they
declared that both men and women were created equally and each can attain perfection
independently; women are not dependent on men to attain perfection and salvation.
However, men and women should have different roles in their lives since they have
different rights and duties. In other words, while neo-traditionalist changed some genderbiased assumptions underlying classical fiqh text, they defended the fiqh model of gender
relations since they believed that this model is in line with human nature.

12
The theory of naturalness of shariʼa law was first introduced by Allameh Tabatabaʼi, a famous shiʼa
philosopher, in pre-revolutionary Iran, in his Qurʼanic commentary known as Al-mizan. This theory was
developed by his student Murtaza Mutahhari as the philosophical foundation of shariʼa law.
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They believed that both men and women are equal in the eyes of God, but this equality
does not mean that both genders should have equal rights and duties. Since men and women
have biological differences, they were assigned different rights and duties. This difference
in rights and duties does not mean inequality or injustice; rather, it is the very essence of
justice, which was reflected in fiqh rules.
In this regard, jurists, in their defense of the fiqh notion of women’s rights, tried to reform
traditional assumptions underlying classical fiqh rules. They proposed the notion of
complementarity of gender rights and duties and the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa
law. In their endeavor to modify the gender biased assumptions underlying traditional fiqh
texts, neo-traditionalists looked to Western sources like sociological and psychological
sources to prepare scientific evidence for their argument. However, their usage of scientific
sources was selective and they just used those modern theories that were in line with the
fiqh definition of gender relations.
To better clarify the standpoint of neo-traditional jurists on women’s status and gender
relations in Islam, I refer to the ideas of Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, one of the most
famous Shi’a jurists in contemporary Iran. Mutahhari’s ideas, which were expressed in his
book, The System of Women’s rights in Islam, have been followed by the majority of
contemporary jurists in Iran as the reference of their discussion for women’s rights in Islam.
Most neo-traditional jurists have accepted Mutahhari’s definition and explanation of
human rights in general and women’s rights in particular in Islam. Hence, his interpretation
of women’s rights can be used as the representative of the interpretation of women’s rights
in neo-traditionalist discourse.
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Not only do neo-traditionalists follow Mutahhari’s explanation of women’s rights, but also
traditional jurists who are responsible for making Islamic law in contemporary Iran have
admitted to following his opinions. Therefore, his opinions about the Islamic definition of
gender roles and women’s rights have been accepted by both traditional and neo-traditional
jurists. His argument is based on the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa law, which
considers fiqh rules in line with human nature (fitra). Mutahhari does not accept the
assumption that “women were created of and for men”; however, he believes that nature
separately has granted a certain kind of characteristic to men and women, which cannot be
exchanged. According to the separate dispositions granted by nature, men and women hold
different rights and are responsible for different duties in their lives. In this regard, he
considers women’s sexuality subordinate to men’s sexuality as a consequence of gender
differences in emotional dispositions and moral issues:
“Under the command of creation, every man and woman has a certain disposition
and certain characteristics, when compared with each other, which cannot be
exchanged and are not the same. . . . Nature has devised the ties of husband and
wife in such a form that the part of woman is to respond to the love of man. The
affection and love of a woman that is genuine and stable can only be that love which
is born as a reaction to the affection and admiration of man towards her. So the
attachment of the woman to the man is the result of the attachment of the man to
the woman and depends upon it. Nature has given the key of love of both sides to
the man, the husband. If he loves his wife and is faithful to her, the wife also loves
him and remains faithful to him. It is admitted that women are naturally more
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faithful than men, and that a woman’s unfaithfulness is a reaction to the
unfaithfulness of the man.” (Mutahhari 1991: 297 and 274)
Mutahhari did not change or modify the body of classical fiqh rules on marriage and gender
relations; instead, he presented a new rationalization for classical Islamic laws. For
instance, he stated that the right to divorce should remain in the hand of men because the
law of Nature has granted this right to men:
“Nature has deposited the key of the natural dissolution of marriage in the custody
of man. In other words, it is a man who by his own apathy and unfaithfulness
towards her wife makes her cold and unfaithful. Conversely, if the indifference
begins on the side of the wife, it does not affect the affection of the man, rather,
incidentally, it makes the affection more acute.” (Ibid: 297)
If the fiqh rules on gender relations and women’s rights are based on the natural differences
between both genders, then these rules remain everlasting, which cannot be changed in
various social, cultural, and political circumstances. Natural differences are defined as
biologic and inborn emotional differences, which are constant ubiquitously. Indeed,
rationalization of Islamic laws according to the natural differences between men and
women distances these laws from the influences of time and society. While neotraditionalists changed the gender-biased assumptions underlying classical fiqh texts, they
did not make considerable changes in the form of classical fiqh rules. For instance, they
accentuated emotional and moral aspects of marriage, and did not look to marriage as a
model of sale contract the same as classical jurists. However, their conclusion of Islamic
laws on marriage was the same as that of traditional jurists. In other words, what neo-
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traditional jurists did was provide a new justification for gender-biased Islamic laws on
gender roles and women’s rights.
Definition of Women’s rights and Gender Roles in Traditionalist Discourse:
While neo-traditional jurists, alongside traditionalists, changed the form of some parts of
fiqh rules on gender issues, they have mostly remained faithful to the classical
interpretation of fiqh texts. They have tried to prepare a new explanation and rationalization
for definitions of fiqh on women’s rights. In this regard, they have followed of Mutahhari’s
ideas in the rationalization of Islamic legal thought. Not only have neo-traditional jurists
followed Mutahhari’s ideas on women’s rights in Islam, but also traditional jurists applied
his theories in their arguments for gender roles and women’s rights in Islam. To better
clarify the standpoint of traditionalist discourse on women’s rights, I refer to the ideas of
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, as one of the most influential jurists in making Islamic law in
Iran. Present traditional jurists usually refer to his theories in their discussions on women’s
issues. Moreover, his opinions are in line with the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran
on women’s rights and gender roles. It is true that the ideas of Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi
are representative of traditionalist discourse in contemporary Iran. However, his ideas can
also be discussed within neo-traditionalist discourse. He believes in neo-traditional
assumptions underlying Islamic law, like the theory of the naturalness of shariʼa law,
which was proposed by Ayatollah Mutahhari. Moreover, he believes that jurists should
take into account the modern realities of Muslim society, as well as the results of modern
science, in making Islamic law.
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Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi classifies various theories on gender differences into three
groups and describes Islamic worldview on gender differences:
“There are three distinct theories about the differences between men and women.
The first theory doesn’t consider any difference between men and women.
According to this theory, we shall accept that all men and women are equal in all
aspects of their lives. However, this theory isn’t compatible with scientific rules
and the reality of life. Those, specifically Westerns, who support this theory in their
argument on gender differences, disregard equality between both genders in their
practical lives.
The second theory considers the status of men higher than women’s. This theory
believes in gender differences and considers men as the first gender and women as
the second gender. Men’s rights are accepted and women’s rights are denied in this
theory.
Both of these theories are incorrect since they don’t rely on the real differences
between men and women. The correct perspective on gender differences, which is
the Islamic perspective, says that men and women have different responsibilities in
their lives according to their different physical and mental characteristics. To better
understand the differences between men and women’s responsibilities, the status of
men and women in the society can be assimilated to the status of mind and heart in
the body. We cannot say that heart has higher status than mind in the body. Each
of those parts has separate vital responsibilities in the body. In fact, without each
of these parts, the body fails to survive.
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Therefore, by paying attention to the real differences between men and women,
Islamic laws on gender issues are easy to follow and understand.” (Tahura journal:
2008) 13
Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi assimilates society to the human body, and the role of men and
women in a society to the role of heart and mind in a body. Mind and heart have separate
responsibilities in a body and the whole function of a body depends on the function of
them, respectively. While the proper function of these two parts is essential for the proper
function of the body, neither of them can replace the other’s responsibilities.
To better clarify his ideas about the naturalness of differences in gender roles, Ayatollah
Makarem Shirazi provides examples of social roles, which are done by men and women,
respectively:
“There are many works in a society that are classified as harsh works. We believe
that since women are more sensitive than men, these harsh works are not
compatible with their emotional characteristics. Therefore, these works are
appropriate for men. For instance, commanding a brigade is a harsh work, which is
suitable for men, not women, as well as being the pirate of a warplane. A pirate
needs to know skydiving and other hard skills. In every place in the world, these
works are done by men.” (Ibid)
In the same way, he provides an example of fiqh rules on differences in gender roles:

13

Pajuheshgah olum ensani va motaleate farhangi, (Human science and cultural studies institute) arranged
this interview with Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, and published his opinions on women’s rights in Tahura
journal, portal jame olum ensani, on 87/1/12, 03/31/2008.
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“Judgment is also considered as a harsh and rough job, where a judge sometimes
sentences the death penalty for a culprit, whipping for a condemned person, or
taking away all of a theft’s belongings. It is stated in Islam that a woman’s
sensitiveness and soft-heartedness is not in line with harsh judgment environment.
However, women can receive many other roles in the society that have higher status
than judgment and are more suitable for them.” (Ibid)
Therefore, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi distinguishes different roles for men and women
according to their different physical and emotional characteristics. Moreover, he confirms
that there always are exceptions among men and women in physical and metaphysical
characteristics. For instance, he states that maybe there is a woman who is less sensitive
than men and is able to do the harsh works. However, a ruler does not have to pay attention
to the exceptions in making a law. A ruler always considers characteristics of the majority
of population in creating laws; he cannot make a rule according to the characteristics of the
minority or the exceptions. Therefore, a ruler always makes a law according to the
characteristics of the majority of the population. In all places in the world, rulers disregard
characteristics of the exceptions in creating laws. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi explains that
this methodology used in making law is based on the principle of hikmah 14. According to
the principle of hikmah, a ruler always tries to make a law compatible with the
characteristics of the majority of population. This law must be obeyed by the whole of

14

The literal meaning of hikmah is wisdom in Arabic. Hikmah, or wisdom, is the application of the right
knowledge at the right time to a specific issue. Hikmah is to know as the best of things by way of the best
of sciences. This term can be associated with all matters of human life. In other words, there is not any
limitation to the application of hikmah in every aspect of our lives.
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population, even by the exceptions that their characteristics are not similar to the
characteristics of the majority. The principle of hikmah also applies in making Islamic law.
For instance, he provides examples of Islamic laws on women’s rights, in which the jurists
pay attention to the characteristics of the majority of the population and disregard specific
characteristics of minorities:
“In Islam, the heritage for men is twice women’s heritage. It is because in Islamic
worldview, men are responsible for the whole expenses of the family; they have to
cover the expenses of home, clothing, the wife’s dower, medicine, etc. A man has
to satisfy the whole of his wife’s and his children’s needs. He is the only one
responsible for meeting the family costs. 15
Therefore, since a man has more economic responsibility than a woman in the
family, his heritage is twice that of a woman. Some people say that there are
families in which women are responsible for the expenses of the family. In some
families, men are unemployed and women are the breadwinner and economic
supporter of the family. Therefore, in such families, women’s heritage must be the
same as or twice men’s heritage. We (jurists) reply to these people that if we want
to consider these exceptions in making laws, there will always be challenges in the
law of heritage. A ruler cannot easily distinguish whether a woman has more or less
responsibility in her family. A ruler cannot make a rule for these exceptions. Hence,

15
This interpretation of Islamic worldview regarding the assignment of economic responsibilities in the
family had also been articulated by Murtaza Mutahhari (for instance, see “the system of women’s rights in
Islam”: 78).

59

according to the principle of hikmah, we should look to the characteristics of the
majority of population. In most cases, men are the breadwinner and are responsible
for the expenses of family. Therefore, their heritage was determined to be twice
women’s.” (Ibid)
He also provides another example of Islamic laws on men’s and women’s rights to show
the naturalness of shariʼa law:
“According to the principle of hikmah in Islamic law, men’s diyeh 16 is twice that
of women’s. The reason for this difference is that the death of husband in a family
will cause more economic pressure for that family than the death of wife. Since a
man is responsible for the expenses of his family, his death will bring more
economic pressure for his family than the death of his wife. Some people say that
the difference in the amount of diyeh shows that there is a difference in Islam
between the price of men’s and women’s blood. This explanation is not true, since
killing a man or a woman has the same punishment in the God’s eyes. Difference
in men’s and women’s diyeh is related to the economic issues. Again, since a ruler
looks to the characteristics of the majority, he considers men, not women, as the
main supporters of the expenses of families. Therefore, men’s diyeh should be twice
that of women’s.” (Ibid)

16

Diyeh is an Arabic term, which means ransom or blood money. According to Islamic law, diyeh is the
financial recompense is given to the victim or the heirs of a victim in the cases of murder, the loss of body
parts, or the damage of property. This punishment is an alternative to the punishment of Qisas (equal
retaliation) in Islamic jurisprudence.
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As we can see, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi tries to rationalize the differences in Islamic
laws on gender issues. He confirms that this difference in Islamic laws on gender issues is
based on the natural differences between men and women. Men and women play different
roles in a society and, according to their natural and inborn characteristics, they have
different duties and responsibilities in their family and society. Therefore, Islamic laws
must be based on these differences and hence, must be different for men and women. While
he confirms that Islamic laws for men and women are different, he does not believe that
these laws are always constant and everlasting. He states that there are two kinds of Islamic
laws: constant laws and variable laws. Indeed, according to specific kinds of principles, an
Islamic law can change during history. He declares that an Islamic law can be modified if
one of these three conditions happens:
1- The change in the subject of an Islamic law: according to a general Islamic
principle, we can buy or sell everything that has a considerable Halal 17 benefit.
Perhaps buying and selling one thing in the past time was not permissible according
to Islamic laws since that thing did not have any considerable benefit. However,
buying and selling of that thing is permissible right now since now it has a
considerable Halal benefit. For instance, human’s blood did not have Halal benefit
in the past. Now, however, it has a Halal benefit. Blood transfusion can save a
person’s live. Therefore, buying and selling a human’s blood is now permissible
according to Islamic laws. Also, animals’ blood is now used for the nutrition of

17
Halal is every object or action that is allowed to use or engage according to Islamic law. Haram is every
object or action that is forbidden to use or engage according to Islamic law. The terms Halal and Haram
cover all items of daily life.
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some other animals. Therefore, buying and selling animals’ blood is also
permissible since it has Halal benefits. One other example in this regard is the
buying and selling of humans’ organs to the sick people who need those organs to
live. In these cases, we can see the change in Islamic laws as the subject of that law
that has changed.
2- A new scientific discovery: In this condition, the subject of an Islamic law has not
changed. Instead, the results of a new scientific discovery have caused the change
in an Islamic law. For instance, it was thought in the past that using tobacco did not
have detriments for the health. Therefore, most of Ulama used to smoke cigarettes
or the hookah. However, now, according to the latest medical discoveries, it has
been proven that using tobacco can cause dangerous illnesses. Therefore, the result
of this medical discovery has caused a change in Islamic law on using tobacco.
Indeed, since jurists did not know that using tobacco had several detriments for
humans’ health, they permitted using tobacco. Now, though, using tobacco is not
permissible according to Islamic law, since its detriment for health has been proven
by recent medical research.
3- The coincidence of a second title on the subject of an Islamic law: Sometimes, with
the passage of time, a second title is attached to an Islamic law, which causes the
change of that law. For instance, in Islam, the right of divorce was completely in
the hands of men. In recent times, divorce conditions have changed and women can
also repudiate their marriage under specific conditions. In present times, if men
have the right to divorce without the supervision of court, women will be deprived

62

of their rights because men are free to repudiate marriage without any logical
reason.
In the past, the divorce rate was very low and men did not repudiate marriage
without logical reasons, but in recent years, they have misused their right for
divorce. Therefore, the change of conditions caused a change in Islamic law of
divorce. In other words, a second title has been attached to the Islamic law of
divorce.
In recent years, women can repudiate marriage through two options: first, they can
include their desired demands in the marriage contract, which must be satisfied by
their husband. If their husband does not pay attention to those demands, the woman
can repudiate marriage. Second: a woman can argue to an Islamic court that she is
in the status of usar wa haraj 18. When an Islamic court finds that a woman is really
in usar wa haraj, it will command the husband to satisfy his wife’s needs. If again
the husband does not pay attention to the court’s commands, Islamic court will
repudiate their marriage according to the women’s request without her husband’s
consent (Ibid).
According to Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, if each of the above conditions happens, an
Islamic law on women’s issues will change. Again, he confirms that a change in an
Islamic law can only happen if the characteristics of the subject of an Islamic law have
changed. On the other hand, if the subject of a law has not changed, the law will remain
unchanged. This is because what the prophet declared Halal will remain Halal and

18
Usar wa haraj is a concept in Islamic fiqh, which means the continuation of marriage will cause the
woman harm and hardship.
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what he declared Haram will remain Haram until the doomsday. He claims that if we
act according to this methodology, many problems on women’s issues will be solved.
However, he cautions that we should not join the international women’s convention
because joining this convention is not useful for women. We should act according to
traditional fiqh texts, which regulate every aspect of our lives (Ibid).

CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION
Discussion and Conclusion:
Since one of the main purposes of the Islamic revolution in Iran was to return to the ideals
of shariʼa, after the Islamic revolution, the Iranian Islamic state translated the fiqh notion
of gender into the state policy. In the early years of the Islamic state, jurists responsible for
legislating civil laws followed traditional readership of fiqh texts and created the Islamic
constitution on the basis of the classical fiqh definition of gender. Because of the support
of the majority of the Iranian population of the Islamic revolution and its ideals, traditional
jurists were not required to provide any explanation or rationalization for the Islamic laws
on women’s issues in the early years of revolution.
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After one decade of the establishment of the Islamic state, Iranian feminist and reformist
activists questioned gender-biased aspects of Islamic laws. Decrease of political pressure
inside Iran after the presidential election in 1997 provided this opportunity for reformist
and feminist activists to develop a new discourse on gender based on modern and Western
values. With the emergence of reformist discourse and the expansion of reformist and
feminist activism, a new generation of Iranian jurists, known as neo-traditional or modern
jurists, tried to provide a rational explanation for their traditional readership of classical
fiqh texts.
Different factors caused the development of Islamic feminist discourse in Iran. The
processes of globalization, which made Iranian Muslim feminists connected to Western
and non-Muslim feminist activists, the activities of secular feminists, and the expansion of
modern and postmodern ideas on gender roles and human rights in the intellectual
atmosphere of Iran were all influential on the development of Iranian Islamic feminism.
Among all of these factors, it was the reformist movement that had the most influence on
the development of Iranian feminism. Indeed, the new approach in the interpretation of
Islamic laws and sacred texts expanded in the reformist discourse was greatly used by
Iranian Muslim feminists in the development their Islamic feminist discourse.
Iranian Muslim feminists’ activism, as well as reformists’ endeavors in challenging
philosophical foundations of fiqh rulings made not only neo-traditional but also traditional
jurists reconsider Islamic laws on gender issues. Another factor that pushed jurists to
rethink fiqh rules on gender issues was the influence of Western values and modern
lifestyles on the Iranian family structure. The entrance of Western values has changed the
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lifestyles of Iranian people and the structure of the Iranian family. Increased presence of
women in higher education and workplaces, increased rate of divorce and single-parent
families, the prevalence of pre-marital sexual relationships, increased presence of women
in the political structure, and the development of women’s social activism are all among
the realities of Iranian women’s lives in recent decades. These factors stimulated traditional
and neo-traditional jurists to accommodate classical fiqh texts with the modern realities of
Iranian society.
In this regard, they have changed gender-biased assumptions underlying classical fiqh
texts, as well as those parts of Islamic law which are not in line with women’s rights. While
neo-traditional jurists, alongside traditionalists, changed the form of some parts of fiqh
rules on gender issues, they have mostly remained faithful to the classical interpretation of
fiqh texts. Indeed, they have tried to prepare a new explanation and rationalization for the
definitions of fiqh on women’s rights.
According to the neo-traditionalist viewpoint, Islamic laws must be different for men and
women, and only with this difference will justice toward both genders be served. The
philosophy of Islamic laws is based on the theory of complementarity of gender rights and
duties. Men and women have different responsibilities and duties in a society, and hence,
different rules must regulate their lives. Neo-traditionalists believe that Islam is a religion
of fairness, which brings justice for everyone. This justice is only guaranteed if there are
gender differences in Islamic law. In other words, they believe that Islamic law is fair
toward both genders, but this fairness does not mean proportional equality. To rationalize
their understanding of gender differences in Islamic law, they provide various explanations.
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On the one hand, they advocate for the theory of naturalness of shariʼa law, which states
that fiqh rules are in line with human nature (fitra). They say that from a biological
perspective, women and men have some natural and inborn differences that demand
different considerations regarding their rights and duties.
For instance, Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari says that in Islam, the right for divorce is in
the custody of men because nature has granted this right to men. He believes that naturally,
if unfaithfulness begins on the side of a man, it makes his wife cold and unfaithful. Rather,
if the indifference begins on the side of a woman, it makes her husband’s affection more
acute. Hence, this is a man who can make his wife cold and indifferent through showing
apathy toward her, and therefore can dissolute the marriage. If a woman shows this
indifference toward her husband, the result would be reversed since the woman’s
indifference will increase the man’s affection and will strengthen the romantic relationship.
He continues that it is admitted that naturally, women are more faithful than men and their
unfaithfulness is a reaction to men’s unfaithfulness (Mutahhari, 1991: 297 and 274). This
explanation is based on the theory of naturalness of shariʼa law.
On the other hand, neo-traditionalists provide scientific explanations for their genderbiased readership of fiqh texts. They claim that Islamic laws on gender issues are also
compatible with scientific theories. In this regard, Ayatollah Murtaza mutahhari provides
examples from Western sources in sociology and psychology to rationalize assumptions
underlying classical fiqh texts. He does not accept previous gender-biased assumptions
underlying classical fiqh texts introduced by traditional jurists, like the assumption that
“women are created of and for men.” Instead, he provides other assumptions, which are
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based on natural and biological differences between men and women. He believes that
these assumptions are also supported by scientific results. However, his usage of scientific
theories, in supporting assumptions underlying fiqh rules, is selective. He uses those parts
of scientific theories that are parallel with the fiqh definition of gender and avoids using
those parts of modern science that contradict with the definition of gender relations in
classical fiqh texts in his argument.
He says that Islam has done a great service to women. It has recognized women’s natural
rights and has given them independence, freedom, and personality. However, there are
differences between the steps taken by Islam and the West toward women’s issues. One of
these differences is about the psychology of men and women. He believes that Islam has
done and revealed a great wonder in the field of psychology of men and women, which is
different in some angles from that of Western psychology (Mutahhari 1999: 13).
Indeed, his usage of psychological sciences is selective; to support his argument on
women’s rights, he refers to those parts of modern sciences that are consistent with the
psychology of men and women presented by Islam. He refers to the ideas of those Western
scientists who believed in natural differences between males and females. For instance, he
mentions the ideas of Alexis Carrel, a French psychologist and biologist, who believed that
according to the law of creation, men and women have been created differently, and
because of these natural differences, they must have different rights and obligations (Ibid:
53). Carrel believed that differences between men and women are not just related to
differences in the shape of their genital organs, or the female’s capacity to give birth to
children. It emerges from the differences in chemicals, which genital glands secrete into
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the blood. Organic and psychological differences between men and women require them
to advance in two dissimilar directions. We should not visualize for women the same kind
of aspirations and ideals, the same kind of life, and the same way of thinking as we visualize
for men (Ibid).
Mutahhari provides a similar explanation of the biological differences between males and
females to that of another psychologist, professor Reek. He says that professor Reek, who
has done extensive research about the affairs of men and women, also confirms that men
and women have two different bodies, which are not similar in composition. They do not
act or feel similarly, nor do they have similar reactions to various incidents. Indeed, they
belong to two different worlds (Ibid: 57).
Mutahhari states that in the modern world, the more medical, social, and psychological
studies are done, the bigger disparities between men and women are discovered. According
to the results of modern science, it is now obvious that the world of men is different from
that of women in many respects (Ibid: 56).
This trend of using scientific theories to rationalize gender-biased aspects of Islamic laws
has been followed by contemporary traditional jurists. In addition, it seems that present
traditional jurists even put more weight on the role of recent discoveries of modern sciences
in their analysis of fiqh texts. Not only do they try to find a scientific basis for classical fiqh
rules, but they also consider a possibility of changing in those parts of Islamic laws that are
not supported by scientific results.
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Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi says that an Islamic law can be modified if it is not supported
by science. He provides an example of using tobacco, which was permissible in the past
time since it was thought that using tobacco did not have any detriment to the health.
However, using tobacco is not permissible right now according to Islamic law, since it has
been proven by the science that it is harmful for the health. It seems that Ayatollah
Makarem Shirazi relies on the findings of medical sciences. However, his opinion about
the findings of human sciences is not as clear as his opinion about the findings of medical
sciences.
While the important parts of the assumptions underlying fiqh rules, like the assumptions of
women’s sexuality, are mostly discussed in human sciences, it is not clear to what extent
traditional jurists rely on the findings of human sciences on these issues. For instance, both
Shiʼa and Sunni jurists believe that God gave women greater sexual desire than men.
Hence, women’s sexual desire must be controlled by men (Mir-Hosseini 2003). If it is
proven by the results of psychological and sociological research that women’s sexual desire
is not greater than men’s, then men will not be responsible for controlling women’s
sexuality and women are not to be subjugated to men. However, it is not obvious whether
traditional jurists accept such findings of human sciences in the field of gender relations
and women’s sexuality as authentic scientific rules. We cannot say whether they change
their assumptions underlying fiqh rules according to the results of modern science.
On the other hand, traditionalists, like neo-traditional jurists, mostly assign differences in
male and female sexuality to the natural and inborn differences between both genders,
which were designed by God. To support their argument, they only use those parts of
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scientific theories that are in line with their definition of human sexuality and gender roles.
Indeed, their usage of the theories of human sciences is selective, the same as the neotraditionalists’ method in reference to human sciences. They advocate for the theory of
naturalness of shariʼa law. According to this theory, differences in male and female
sexuality, as well as differences in gender roles, remain constant and unchangeable during
time.
Therefore, it is hard to say that traditionalists will rely on the findings of human sciences
on gender issues and women’s rights in the same way that they have relied on the findings
of medical science. Indeed, there is a pessimistic perspective among traditional and neotraditional jurists toward human sciences, as they believe that these sciences are not in line
with people’s religious beliefs. It seems that with the existence of this pessimistic attitude
toward Western human sciences among governmental figures, as well as traditional and
neo-traditional jurists, especially in the recent years, it is unlikely that the findings of
Western human sciences will have considerable effects on traditionalist discourse
underlying Islamic laws.
In addition to considering the possibility of change in Islamic law according to the findings
of modern science, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi considers another possibility of change in
Islamic law according to the change in social conditions of the society. He says that an
Islamic law can be changed when a second title coincides on its subject. His example in
this regard is the right for divorce, which was completely in the custody of men. However,
in recent times, divorce conditions have changed and women can also repudiate their
marriage under a specific set of conditions. He says that because in recent times, men have
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repudiated the marriage contract without any logical reason, Islamic law of divorce has
changed to limit men’s freedom in repudiating the marriage contract and to restore
women’s rights. Therefore, the change in the contemporary social conditions has caused
the change in the Islamic law of divorce.
While he supports the change in the Islamic law for divorce, he does not believe in the
necessity of modifying the Islamic laws of heritage and diyeh. He provides a rationalization
for gender differences in the Islamic laws of heritage and diyeh. He explains that a man is
responsible for all of the expenses of his family; a man has to satisfy all of his wife’s and
children’s needs. Therefore, since a man has more economic responsibility than a woman
in a family, his heritage must be twice that of a woman. In the same way, he explains that
since a man is responsible for the expenses of the family, his death will cause more
economic pressure on his family than the death of his wife. Therefore, men’s diyeh must
also be twice that of women’s. He continues that there are families in which men are
unemployed and women are responsible for the expenses of the family. However, these
families are in the minority and jurists cannot pay attention to the characteristics of
minorities in making laws.
According to this explanation, the question is that if a considerable change happens in
social conditions in which women will have more economic responsibilities than men in
their families, will the Islamic laws on heritage and diyeh be modified? Traditional jurists’
answer to this question is obscure. On the one hand, they say that jurists look to the
characteristics of the majority of the population in making laws. Hence, we expect that if
in most families women have more economic responsibility than men, then their heritage
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will be twice or at least the same as men’s. On the other hand, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi
says that in Islam, men are responsible for the expenses of their family. He believes that
according to Islamic teachings, a man has to satisfy all of his wife’s and his children’s
needs. With this explanation, we expect that the change in social and economic conditions
of a society does not provide any change in men’s responsibilities in supporting the
economic needs of their families. Hence, the Islamic law of men’s heritage will remain
unchangeable under different social and economic conditions.
Therefore, it seems that traditionalists’ attention to the results of modern science and their
attention to the change of social conditions in modifying Islamic law are selective. While
they believe that the change in social conditions and the results of modern science are both
influential in modifying Islamic laws, they do not apply this rule to all parts of fiqh rules.
Traditionalists did not clearly specify which differences between men and women are
inborn and natural and which differences are the products of specific social conditions.
Meanwhile, they have provided a rationalization for gender differences in the majority of
fiqh rules according to the theory of “naturalness of shariʼa law,” and have modified only
a few parts of fiqh rules according to the changes in social conditions or the results of
modern sciences. It is because they believe that most parts of classical fiqh rules are
everlasting; only a few parts of these rules require modifications in order to be employed
in modern times. Therefore, while they have tried to change traditional gender-biased
assumptions underlying Islamic laws, they have not changed most parts of these laws
regarding gender issues.
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Moreover, traditionalist discourse confirms that classical fiqh texts can regulate every
aspect of our lives. We can find a solution for every problem and an appropriate answer
for all questions we have in our lives in fiqh texts. Therefore, traditional jurists define
gender relations, women’s rights, and all aspects of women’s sexuality within an Islamic
context. This philosophy of interpreting Islamic sources is different from the reformists’
philosophy.
Indeed, both reformist and traditional thinkers believe that Islam is a religion of fairness
and justice. They both see in the shariʼa equality for both genders, however they reach
different conclusions in applying Islamic laws from the shariʼa. Reformists and
traditionalists believe in women’s rights, but they define them in two different ways. While
neo-traditional and traditional jurists believe that gender differences in Islamic law bring
justice for both males and females, reformists believe that justice and fairness toward both
genders can only be acquired through proportional equality.
These differences between reformists’ and traditionalists’ standpoint on women’s issues
are based on their different philosophy in interpreting Islamic sources. Reformists, in
contrast to traditional and neo-traditional jurists, consider a distinction between religion
and religious knowledge. They believe that the objective part of religion, which is the
revealed text, is different from religious knowledge, or the interpretation of that revealed
text. While the objective side of religion (the revealed text) is sacred, holy, and immutable,
religious knowledge is always subject to evolution. In this regard, reformists believe that
all aspects of our understanding and interpretation of sacred texts, including fiqh rules, rest
in the domain of religious knowledge and are subject to modification. On the other side,
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traditionalists consider their own understanding of sacred texts, which is represented in fiqh
rules, as holy and fixed as the sacred texts themselves. Indeed, by differentiating between
these two concepts (religion and religious knowledge), reformists’ and traditionalists’
standpoints on shariʼa ideals and fiqh rules can better be understood.
Traditionalists believe that Islam has regulations for every aspect of our lives, and we can
find an appropriate answer for all of our questions in Islamic sources. Therefore, to define
women’s sexuality and gender relations, they refer to the definition of classical fiqh texts
on these issues. They think that women’s sexuality and gender relations were ordained
Divinely, and hence are sacred and unchangeable. Rather, reformists see women’s
sexuality as regulated by social circumstances and not by Divine will. Reformists claim
gender inequality embedded in Islamic laws as a societal construction by male jurists that
is neither sacred nor fixed, and rather is human and subject to contestation.
Not only do traditional and neo-traditional jurists define gender roles and women’s issues
within as Islamic context, but they also believe that Islam has a clear opinion about all other
aspects of human life. In contrast to this readership of Islamic sources in traditionalist
discourse, reformist discourse considers other responsibilities for religion. Reformists
believe that religions and Islam in particular do not have any responsibility to regulate all
aspects of human lives. They state that all parts of sacred texts should not be used as
unchangeable sources in making Islamic laws, since those parts are just compatible with
the social conditions of the early years of Islam.
In this regard, Abdolkarim Soroush distinguishes between the essential parts and accidental
parts of the sacred texts. He argues that there are essential parts (zati) in the Qurʼan, which
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are unchangeable and everlasting. These parts are the main foundations of Islam; without
them Islam is no longer Islam. On the other hand, there are some other parts in the Qurʼan
as a result of the society and time in which the prophet was born and raised. He calls those
parts as accidental (arazi). (Soroush 1989: 4-19). Although he does not separate essential
parts from accidentals in every verse of sacred texts, he provides a criterion in separating
essential parts from accidentals in the Qurʼan: this criterion is based on this knowledge
about things that could have happened in other ways. For example, the principle of oneness
and uniqueness of God (tawheed) is an essential part of the Qurʼan because it cannot have
happened otherwise and without it, Islam is not actually Islam. However, it was an
accidental of history that Muhammad was born in Arabia and therefore the language of the
Qurʼan became Arabic language, which shaped the main conceptual framework of the
Qurʼan (Soroush 1999: 21).
He believes that most historical events that happened in the years of revelation rest in the
domain of accidentals. In order to have access to the core message of the religion, which
he calls essentials, we should translate historical events from past to present. In other
words, we should differentiate between “historical Islam” and “the spirit of Islam”. In this
regard, he refers to various items that can help us in reconstructing “historical Islam”.
These items are additions to the sacred texts and are known as accidentals in his argument.
For instance, he says that the particular language, particular concepts, and particular
methods the prophet used to transfer the essence of religion to the people, as well as some
questions and answers transmitted between the prophet and other Muslims, are among
accidentals.
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With this criterion, most parts of social rules on women’s issues rest in the realm of
accidentals, since they could have happened in other ways if the prophet lived in other
societies or in other times. Also, most parts of sacred texts are accidentals; just a limited
part of these texts are essentials. In line with this explanation, Alireza Alavitabar said that
not only the Arabic language and culture, but also scientific stories, historical events, and
many stories in the Qurʼan and the prophet’s tradition, lie in the realm of accidentals and
do not apply to this time (Alavitabar 2003).
Reformers believe that the purpose of Islam was to talk about and accentuate the essential
parts. Accidental parts are just related to the society and time in which the prophet was
born and lived:
“God’s revelation is like a muse, an “inspiration” for poets, and Muhammad
transmitted this “inspiration,” in the language he knows, and the style his people
understand, to reveal the essentials of the new religion of Islam, without doing
without the accidentals, i.e. the socio-cultural circumstances that bound both the
prophet and his community. If Muhammad lived in a different context, time and
space, revelation could have been translated differently, but its core message would
have been the same.” 19
Hence, according to the reformist discourse, the essential parts of sacred texts reveal the
core message of Islam, which is permanent; the accidental parts are additions to the sacred

19
This is a part of Michel Hoebik’s interview with Dr. Soroush on December 2007 under the name of “The
word of Muhammad”. http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INTThe%20Word%20of%20Mohammad.html.
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texts that a believer in Islam must understand according to various contexts and
circumstances. The accidental parts are fallible; in other words they are open to change
according to various contexts.
Soroush further proposed the notion of “minimalist religiosity” against the notion of
“maximalist religiosity” as a supplemental commentary to “the theory of essential and
accidentals in religion.” Soroush believes that religion does not say everything and
believers should not expect too much of religion (Hashas, 2014). He has a minimalist
perspective toward the elements of religion, like fiqh and ethics. He considers ethical values
as objective, minimalist, accidental, and this-worldly (secular). He further continues that
“fiqh is incomplete; it is perfect in terms or precepts (theory), and not in planning; it is
minimalist, and not maximalist; it is not religion” (Soroush 2009: 100-1). Believers seek
perfection and salvation in religion. They generally wish to find everything in religion. In
other words, they look at religion as a maximal reservoir and source in which they can find
appropriate answers for every question in their lives. However, it is not the purpose of
religion to talk about everything. The main purpose of religion, according to the reformist
perspective, is to talk about essentials. In fact, Islam has some rules regulating believers’
social lives. However, we should draw attention to the fact that these social rules are not
maximal. Also, those rules should be modified to be employed in the present time. In the
case of fiqh law, Soroush says that classical jurists extract maximums from minimums.
They have changed fiqh rules to a final verdict regulating every aspect of believers’ lives,
instead of making minimums adjustable to various circumstances and changeable
according to the spirit of religion (Soroush 2009: 94-97).
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It is because traditional jurists’ orientation toward religion, shariʼa, and ethics is
otherworldly. The otherworldly view considers the rationale behind the Islamic law a
Divine rationale or a Divine secret. This viewpoint sees Islamic laws as duties with the
purpose of producing felicity in the hereafter. It loses the spirit of religion and focuses on
the ultimate consequences of Islamic laws in the hereafter. Therefore, otherworldly
oriented religion severs ties with the problems emerge from social affairs. It emphasizes
believers’ duties, which have been assigned by Divine order and are reflected in Islamic
laws.
On the other side, reformists try to generally consider religion and shariʼa this-worldly,
and not otherworldly. They try to make a link between the shariʼa and this world. In thisworldly perspective, the rationale behind the Islamic laws is not a secret Devine rationale,
rather it is believers’ social affairs and society’s needs. In this worldview, the main purpose
of fiqh rules is to run social affairs and solve problems that emerge from them. Islamic laws
are judged according to their immediate, and not ultimate, consequences.
From the reformist perspective, Islamic laws are in general based on human rights, and not
on human duties. Since Islamic laws are judged according to their immediate
consequences, they are constantly subject to change and contestation. If they cannot satisfy
believers’ needs, they have to be modified. This is the meaning of the historical translation
of accidentals from the past to present. Islamic rules, which have regulated believers’ lives
in the history of Islam, are accidentals of religion. They are not based on Divine order;
instead are this-worldly and based on social order. Hence, they need to be modified
constantly according to the present social affairs and current people’s needs. According to
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this explanation, reformist discourse, in contrast to traditionalist discourse, not only defines
gender roles, gender relations, and women’s rights out of the religious context, but also
constantly modifies its definitions according to the changes in social conditions.
However, reformists and feminists do not play a considerable role in making Islamic law
in Iran. Extracting Islamic law from sacred texts is only in the hand of traditional jurists. It
does not seem that traditionalists will include reformists in extracting Islamic law from
sacred texts. Therefore, it is only the philosophy and epistemology of traditionalist
discourse which defines assumptions underlying Islamic law Iran. In order to reach gender
equality in Islamic law, the philosophy and epistemology of traditionalist discourse on
gender relations and women’s rights should be modified.
To modify the philosophy of traditionalist discourse, jurists should adopt a minimalist
perspective toward the elements of religion, including fiqh and shariʼa. Traditionalists
should not expect classical fiqh texts to regulate every aspect of human life. If traditional
jurists’ orientation toward fiqh texts is minimal, most aspects of human life, including
women’s issues, can be defined out of the religious context. Following the minimalist
perspective, jurists can rely on the findings of medical sciences, as well as human sciences
in defining women’s sexuality, gender relations, and gender roles. Moreover, if the
majority of women’s issues are defined out of the Islamic context, the orientation toward
these issues will be secular and this-worldly. From this-worldly perspective, Islamic laws
are judged according to their immediate consequences, based on believers’ social affairs
and society’s needs. This-worldly perspective toward fiqh and shariʼa opens more space
for human rights and provides gender equality in Islamic laws.
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